Wednesday 22 May 2024

Submission to the Presidential Truth Commission on Ethnic Violence - 15 October 2001

 

Submission to the Presidential Truth Commission on Ethnic Violence

by Lionel Bopage, Former General Secretary, JVP

October 2001

 

 

 

 

Lionel Bopage

43 Lambrigg Street

Farrer, ACT 2607

AUSTRALIA

Tel:      02 6286 6083 (H)

            02 6283 2153 (O)

Tel/Fax: 02 6286 7983 (H)

E-mail: lbopage@aucom.com.au

 

 

1. Introduction

I would like to thank the Truth Commission for the opportunity to make this submission.  As a person profoundly concerned about unity and reconciliation of all ‘peoples’ of Sri Lanka, I make this submission voluntarily relating to the provisions of the notice calling for representation/evidence.

I do not intend to vilify or discredit any person or an organisation but to reveal the other side of the story which has been hitherto untold in public.  There have been attempts[1] to link the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) to the 1983 July riots and hence justify its proscription by the then UNP government and the late President J R Jayawardena.

Unless the peoples of Sri Lanka become truly reconciled, irrespective of their ethnic, social and religious backgrounds, there is no realistic hope of overcoming the ever-increasing socio-economic and political problems facing the island.  Should Sri Lankan peoples permit themselves to become obsessed with the past, insisting on opening up old wounds and becoming ever more divided, we will all loose the wonderful country we wish to have for our future generations.

I do not make this submission on behalf of the present JVP.  But I accept that until February 1984[2] the JVP carried out its activities within the democratic framework in furtherance of its ideals.  I also do not intend to comment here of merits and dismerits of the methods the JVP adopted after February 1984.

Irrespective of the methods used in the 1980s and afterwards, I tend to believe, all parties to the conflict performed what they sincerely perceived to be the tasks that would satisfy their respective political masters.  Whether we regard the opposing side's cause as morally just, is in my view, neither pertinent to reconciliation, nor relevant in the assessment of the appropriateness of the actions that side has carried out in the given situation.  Therefore, I humbly appeal to the peoples of Sri Lanka not to make harsh judgements on the sincerity of the parties to the conflict.  However, I realize that members of families and friends of those innocent civilians who perished in search and destroy operations, land mine and bomb explosions and aerial bombardments may find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to forgive certain acts committed by the opposing parties to the conflict.

Just to blame one side or the other without critically looking at one’s own side and to keep harping on "crimes" of the other side conveniently, ignoring the fact that atrocities were committed by all parties to the conflict, will not be conducive to reconciliation.  Necessary and essential pre-conditions for moving towards unity and reconciliation of all peoples would be to generate cultural and attitudinal changes appropriate for the functioning of a diverse society.  All peoples will have to accept that the land of Sri Lanka is multicultural, that all cultures of Sri Lanka have to be celebrated, that all peoples are to be treated with dignity, fair-go and self-respect.  All of them should be provided equal opportunities in every sphere of life.  Importantly, the parties to the conflict have to maintain an acceptable climate in which negotiations could take place.  For unity and reconciliation it is necessary to have peace with enough trust between the peoples and groups to disagree on certain issues but suitably change their political and ideological positions when objective situations change.

 

2. Shortcomings of the submission

In the preparation of this submission I had almost no official documentation at my disposal except a few documents I found in my archives.  Upon my resignation, the JVP collected back all official documents and writings, I possessed, of the JVP.  As most of the then JVP leadership was destroyed by the security forces led by the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), there exists only limited ways to corroborate the factual nature of my submission.  However, most of those who were detained in 1983 are still alive and I believe they would corroborate my story if they get the opportunity.  I was thus obliged to rely mainly on my memory or on material available on print.  Nevertheless, I believe this submission would be of assistance to the Commission to arrive at conclusions with an appropriate perspective.

3. Personal background

I was born on 6 September 1944 at Weligama.  In 1968 I joined the JVP and became its General Secretary in 1979.  Since 1974 (while serving a sentence imposed in 1972 under the Criminal Justice Commissions Act, which was subsequently repealed in 1977) I was also responsible for researching into problems of the Tamil people and  conducting political work among the Tamil people, in particular, in the North and East of the country.  I served in this capacity until my resignation from the JVP in February 1984.

I believe fairness and justice should prevail at all levels of society in a democratic political system.  I also believe in forgiveness in all of us, irrespective of status and prominence, as the cornerstone for unity and reconciliation.  However in realpolitic forgiveness is but an ideal that often remains unrealised.  Human ability to reconcile and to come to terms with actions of opposing parties is often limited.  An acceptance of the fact that opposing parties to a conflict acted in good faith in the light of facts available to them at that particular point of time will be a starting point for such an exercise.

4. My reservations

I would like to bring it to your attention that my e-mail message to the Secretary of the Truth Commission requesting permission to make submissions has not yet been responded to.

I am a strong supporter of unity and reconciliation of peoples of Sri Lanka.  It is the only path we can follow, if we wish to save Sri Lanka from the current abyss it is in today.

In order for the people to achieve reconciliation, a peaceful situation should prevail in the country.  All the political forces have to enter into a dialogue and work towards achieving harmony by resolving differences through dialogue and negotiation.  Such a situation does not currently exist in Sri Lanka.  Instead all parties whether or not they are involved in the conflict appear to make use of every possible incident to fuel the conflict and create chaos.  In my opinion this is not a conducive environment for reconciliation and building harmonious relationships among peoples of Sri Lanka. For instance, in South Africa it was only after finding a political solution that the ANC government established its Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

The revelation of what happened in Sri Lanka eighteen years ago may also undermine the trust in the present state of affairs managed by Her Excellency the President of Sri Lanka. There would be severe restrictions to publicly disclose the past actions of the military-politico bureaucracy, which was responsible for the events of 1983 riots and its aftermath.  It is also noteworthy that the period of this aftermath runs till the beginning of the 1990s and does not fall under the purview of the Commission.  Actions of persons in more senior positions of the social, political and military hierarchy who authorised 1983 type of operations demonstrate the dilemma the society is faced with.

With regard to the 1983 riots, there are many unanswered questions. For example, who chose and who authorised the targets during riots? Were any of the former Cabinet members or any other senior government functionaries involved?[3]  What are the true and full facts about the innocent Tamil citizens who were injured and killed in 1983?  What is the total damage to the property?  Who were responsible for the spread of riots to the towns outside Colombo?  What was the role of the law makers (police and armed forces)?  What evidence that the then UNP government had to proscribe the JVP?

Forgiveness among peoples is possible in a post-war situation when peace prevails.  In a situation where the conflict relating to national problem proceeds without any impediment could we achieve any unity and reconciliation?  Is it truly possible?  Is it sufficient to accept by all parties to the conflict, and particularly also by the general public, that all sides acted in the belief of promoting their cause, whatever painful that may have been?  Acceptance by the public is naturally the responsibility of the political leaderships of all persuasions and all peoples.  In a continuing war situation what can conclusions on the moral justification of each other’s actions contribute, if at all, to the ideal of unity and reconciliation?

In the current political environment, revelations of such actions and those responsible can result in extensive damage to the hierarchy, the trust of the population in leading figures of the hierarchy and its international image.  This cannot be conducive to national unity and reconciliation.  In this sense I am skeptical about the Truth Commission's ability to make recommendations to achieve the goal of national unity and reconciliation.  It is also possible that many people would consider the appointment of the Commission a propaganda stunt and hence show a lack of interest in its activities.

In my view reconciliation will be better served by letting the divisions of the past be by-gone and encouraging all peoples to openly and widely discuss issues, particularly among the peoples who do not speak English, without intimidation and threats of personal abuse, and inviting all peoples to joining forces to tackle the immense socio-economic and political problems facing the country.  Development of a democratic constitution and absence of conflict will be good but those measures in themselves will not achieve peace, reconciliation and unity of peoples.  Reconciliation can only be achieved in the hearts and minds through a negotiated peaceful settlement to the current conflict providing dignity, justice and fair-go to all peoples of Sri Lanka.  This will take time. It is, however, the responsibility of all political leaders, irrespective of their hue and colour to provide leadership to actively promote this ideal.

5. Ambit of my submission

In my capacity as former General Secretary of the JVP and Leader of Opposition of the District Development Council (DDC), Galle, my submission is limited to the period I held those positions.

In this context, I wish to inform the Truth Commission on Ethnic Violence that:

·       The JVP was a democratic political party and carried out its activities within its own democratically established and published constitution,

·       It had no intention or plan to overthrow any government elected to the office by the people of Sri Lanka,

·       During the six years 1977-1983 it participated almost in all elections held at all levels and won 15 seats in six districts at the 1981 DDC elections,

·       The JVP was opposed to any form of communalism and racism and stood for equal rights for all citizens and all peoples inhabiting Sri Lanka,

·       The JVP opposed autocratic centralisation or autocratic separation of the country[4] till it made a policy back-flip in June 1983 at its full plenary session of the Central Committee, which discussed solely the issue of right to self-determination of people.  The JVP did not at any time advocate or agitate for separation of the country on ethnic lines,

·       The JVP played no role whatsoever in the 1983 July riots and condemned those black events unreservedly,

·       The late President His Excellency J R Jayawardena under the emergency regulations declared on or about 18 July 1983 the JVP, the Nava Sama Samaja Party (NSSP), and the Communist Party of Sri Lanka (CPSL) proscribed,

·       Many leaders of the said political parties were detained including Mr Prins Gunasekera leader of the Sri Lanka Vimukthi Balavegaya and Mr K P Silva, General Secretary of the CPSL,

·       Proscription of the NSSP and the CP was lifted after several weeks but the proscription of the JVP was maintained for several years that followed,

·       I was detained on or about 2 August 1983 on the basis of a detention order issued by the Col. C A Dharmapala, former Secretary to the Ministry of Defence,

·       Without an iota of evidence against the JVP its leaders, members and sympathizers were continued to be detained and relentlessly hunted islandwide,

·       From July to mid December 1983 more than thirteen persons including myself, many of them having leanings with the JVP, were detained incommunicado[5] at the first floor of the CID and continuously questioned,

·       All of us were released from detention without a single charge, when my detention order was challenged in court,

·       Rumours were ripe that illegal orders have been issued to some officers of the security forces to kill Rohana Wijeweera (Founder and Chairperson) and Upatissa Gamanayake (Politburo member) of the JVP respectively,

·       Also widespread were the rumours that the CID investigation was based on misinformation provided to President Jayawardena by the ISD (Internal Security Division-intelligence wing of the government) and an alleged report submitted by a DIG of Police,

·       It was against this background that members of the Security forces gave, interpreted and carried out their orders, and

·       So far there has been no official declaration issued by the government  clearing the JVP and its members that were detained on the alleged charges of involvement in the 1983 riots.

When making this submission, I am consequently obliged to consider and deal with all these factors.  Furthermore, the events that took place between 1981 and end of 1984 have had disastrous consequences until the beginning of 1990s.  Therefore I touch upon several matters that are related to but falling outside the period prescribed in the Notice calling for Representation/Evidence.  I sincerely hope that my submission will assist the Truth Commission in the execution of its objectives.

6. Political backdrop – 1982-1983

Until the proscription of the JVP in July 1983 my party activities were mainly based at the JVP head office at 14 K Cyril C Perera Mawatha, Colombo-14.

First of all I wish to present my personal experience with specific reference to the period of July 1983.  However I cannot forget that many incidents such as riots against Tamils, rigging of the District Development Council elections in Jaffna, burning of the Jaffna Public Library, killing of members of security forces by the militant Tamil groups and killing of members of the militant groups and Tamil civilians by the anti-terror squads of the security forces influenced the events of 1983.

Pre-1983 period was replete with incidents where terror gangs, paid and maintained by some senior cabinet ministers, and Police were used to attack any form of democratic opposition.  Cases I can recollect were attacks on Buddhist clergy, Professor Ediriweera Sarathchandra and Mrs Vivienne Goonewardena.  When victims of violence filed fundamental rights or civil rights cases against such violence, Courts of Justice at times delivered decisions in victims favour.  When personal fines were imposed on the perpetrators of violence, there were many occasions when the Ministry of Defence paid those fines and promoted the perpetrators in rank.  On the other hand there were many instances when Police officers with integrity who tried to perform their proper duty in cases involving government politicians or their supporters, those officers had been sent on punishment transfers to the North East war zone.  When workers were agitating to win pay rises trade union leaders and workers were subjected to similar treatment.  Hon. Minister Alavi Moulana's case was an example.

Early 1983 I had the occasion to read books printed at the Government Press under the name of Hon. Minister Cyril Matthew and many pamphlets espousing racist propaganda against Tamils.  These publications were available in public.  I had information that such publications were distributed to Sinhala school principals and Sinhala Buddhist organisations islandwide and contributed to arousing feelings of hatred and violence against Tamils.

During the latter part of 1982 and the early part of 1983, from party branches and members of the JVP I received information that mass organisations belonging to the United National Party were having discussions regarding violence taking place in theNnorth and East of the country.  In particular the reports were received from Kandy, Gampaha, Hambantota, Matara and Trincomalee districts.  Discussing the on-going violence and counter-violence between the security forces and the militant Tamil groups, UNP youth organisations and “Jathika Sevaka Sangamaya” (trade union) branches were reported to have discussed ways of teaching Tamils in the South a lesson.  Also I recollect that this was on the basis that the Tamils doing business in the south are funding the Tamil struggle.

In particular, a major piece of information I received was that an organisation or organisations led by Venerable Elle Gunawansa Thero, Hon. Cyril Mathew (a former Minister of the UNP Government) and his son Hon Nanda Mathew were collecting information about Tamil residents and their property in the south of Sri Lanka.  Also I received information about exclusive Sinhala settlements made under Mahaweli scheme in the newly irrigated colonies in Polonnaruwa and Trincomalee areas.  The government, in particular, Hon Gamini Dissanayake, then Minister for Mahaweli Development, and certain agencies of the Department were allegedly providing arms to civilians in these areas in the context of protecting them from the attacks of Tamil militant organisations.

In fact, the JVP used this information at its discussions to make those faithful to the party aware of social tensions developing in the country and warned that this situation may lead to a communal backlash and a social crisis.  We made the general public also aware that there is a Sinhala nationalist extremist agenda to arouse racial tensions in the south.

6.1 Attitude of the UNP leadership towards the JVP

It will be important to consider the relationship between the UNP leadership and the JVP at the time. This will help the Commission to understand the political dynamics of the country that led to the proscription of the JVP in 1983.

Apart from three meetings[6] the JVP leadership had with President J R Jayawardena after our release in 1977, the JVP maintained contact with several leaders of the UNP for a variety of political reasons.  At one of the meetings in April 1982 I had with Hon. Ronnie de Mel, then Minister of Finance, he warned the JVP about the President having received reports from the Internal Security Division (ISD) thinking of using security forces to repress the JVP on some pretext.  At the meeting, the Minister suggested the JVP issuing a public statement to the effect that the JVP does not advocate violent overthrow of the government.  The Politbureau of the JVP obliged by handing over a statement to that effect to the President through the Hon. Minister and the JVP also published in May 1982 this statement as lead article of “Niyamuwa”, the official organ of the JVP, of which I was editor-in-chief.

After this statement there were no direct repressive measures taken against the JVP.  However it had a negative effect on the JVP leadership, in particular, on late Mr Rohana Wijeweera.  The leadership was reluctant to take certain political steps because of possible retaliatory measures by the President against the JVP.  For example Mr Wijeweera and the JVP Central Committee rejected my proposal that the JVP should initiate a political dialogue with militant Tamil groups with progressive leanings.  This decision was based on the ground that the government could use of such dialogue as a pretext for militarily repressing the JVP.

Another instance was when the government enacted Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) on the pretext that it will be used only against Tamil militants.  My proposal to launch an agitation to make people aware of the excessive powers that will be rendered to the security forces and possible misuse at any time they wish (later on, I myself became a victim of the PTA) was also indirectly averted.  The Politburo of the JVP decided that the Human Rights Organisation[7] should be made to undertake this action.  Public lectures were organized by a coalition of Human Rights organisations and trade unions.  The late Mr H N Fernando of the Ceylon Teachers’ Union, Mr Nimal Senanayake and Dr Neelan Thiruchelvam on behalf of the Bar Association of Sri Lanka, Late Mr Upatissa Gamanayake and myself on behalf of the Human Rights Organisation addressed the meetings.  But Mr Wijeweera did not address any of these meetings.

The referendum held in December 1982 to extend the term of the then Parliament was, in the opinion of the JVP, not held in a fair and reasonable manner.  The JVP was the only political party that filed a case[8] in the District Court of Colombo requesting the court to declare the results of the referendum null and void.  The applicant of the case was Mr Rohana Wijeweera and the attorney at law that represented him and the JVP was Mr Prins Gunasekera, now resident in the UK.  The UNP leadership was angry at the file of action by the JVP and the JVP leadership was also well aware of the gravity of the situation.

In or around March 1983 Mr Gamanayake and I had a meeting with late Mr Vijaya Kumaranatunga for the purpose of developing a common platform among the left political parties to counter racist trends and repressive developments in the country.  We had cordial talks at his Narahenpita House and Mr Kumaranatunga wholeheartedly agreed to support such a common platform.  However when this proposal was put forward for discussion at the JVP Politbureau, Mr Wijeweera sidelined the issue and we could not proceed.  At that time there were many false allegations made against Mr Kumaranatunga by President Jayawardena and the UNP government..

I believe these decisions of the JVP, which were a result of avoiding government repressive measures, had an adverse effect on the subsequent political developments in the country.

6.2 Incidents prior to July 1983

In the early part of 1983 there were several incidents published in print media that fishermen of the south, in particular from Matara district, who went by boat to Eastern province for fishing had perpetrated violence and murder against Tamil fishermen in the Eastern province.  I issued a press statement on behalf of the JVP condemning such racially motivated violence committed against Tamil people and requesting people to avoid perpetrating such acts of violence.  Unfortunately with the changing social environment of racial tension, there were major disagreements among the JVP leadership regarding the party’s position on the rights of Tamil people.  By April 1983 the leadership of the JVP, especially, Mr Wijeweera appeared to be perturbed about the press releases I made on these incidents.  And at a politbureau meeting, this issue was discussed and a decision was made that without the prior approval of the polibureau I should not issue any more press releases.

Hostile feelings among the Sinhalese and Tamils were on the rise.  Rumours of possible LTTE attacks on Colombo were widespread and the situation was highly tense and fragile.  General public was becoming increasingly nervous about possible LTTE attacks.  As many incidents of violence against Tamils were occurring, I drafted another press release in May 1983 and presented it to the politbureau.  Mr Wijeweera expressed major concerns about the statement.  One of the concerns was that the JVP would get itself isolated from the Sinhala people and electorally it will be very damaging, especially after the 1982 Presidential election results of the JVP.  Another concern was that the government and the state who were behind these racist moves may also target the JVP because of the political position portrayed by the statement.  The JVP leadership did not, in my opinion, consider in any way that the national problem has been taking prominence on the political landscape of the island.

6.3 Reversal of policy position on self-determination

The issue of right to self-determination of Tamil people was discussed at the said Politbureau meeting and many members were negating the hitherto accepted policy position of the JVP.  I smelled that Mr Wijeweera has canvassed this change privately before discussing the issue at the Politbureau.  I vehemently opposed this policy reversal and rejection of the press release.  I stated my willingness to submit my resignation from the JVP membership if the JVP adopts such an attitude to its political activities.  However at the request of some members of the politbureau, including late Mr Gamanayake, the Politbureau decided to call a special plenary session of the JVP Central Committee to discuss the policy of right to self-determination of Tamil people of Sri Lanka.

At the Central Committee meeting held in Hambantota early July 1983, the policy of right to self-determination was reversed with the support of the overwhelming majority of Central Committee members including the present leader of the JVP Mr Somawansa Amerasingha.  It was an unacceptable situation to me and I had decided to tender my resignation after providing a written explanation to the JVP membership.  However incidents of 1983 July riots took precedence over such intentions.

Since the very beginning of the Tamil militant struggle in early 1970s, the JVP as a political organisation and I as an individual have advocated a political solution to the national problem.  Details of the political solution proposed by the JVP were outlined in the JVP Policy Declaration and the booklet "Marxist Analysis of the National problem"[9].  Until I resigned in 1984 the JVP neither advocated a separate state for any one community nor a military solution to the national problem.  Our solution was based on establishing a constitutional, judicial and political framework for ensuring equality, fairness, justice and dignity for every resident of Sri Lanka irrespective of their background.  As an individual I still do not advocate separation as a solution to the problems of non-Sinhala people but I advocate decentralisation of power, equality of opportunity and equality of access to resources.  I accept the right of Tamil people to determine their own political destiny.  However this does not necessarily imply advocating the formation of a separate state.  For example, the legal right the partners of a family enjoy to achieve divorce has not led to breakdown of family unit system in the society as a whole.  Partners practicing democratic individual rights within the family unit do not necessarily need to exercise the right to divorce in order to addressing their family problems.  And there are counsellors, arbitrators and courts of justice to assist in this process.  They still have the legal right to divorce as a final step to address desperate situations though.

6.4 My experience relating to 1983 riots

I was at ‘Shakthi’ Press of the JVP at Kohilawatta, Angoda when JVP volunteer activists at the Press reported to me that the people in the vicinity were panicked as many were running away from the city saying Tigers have attacked Colombo.  I made inquiries but could not get a clear picture as to what was happening in Colombo.  Having finalized some articles for “Niyamuwa” I had to proceed to the JVP head office at K Cyril C Perera Mawatha and then to my house at Ihala Biyanwila, Kadawatha.  As I was driving through Borella and Maradana I witnessed many properties that had been already set ablaze and many people were attempting to set other buildings on fire.  Some groups were assaulting individuals.  I saw some onlookers enjoying torture being committed against other similar human beings.  Security forces on the street did not appear to take any action to prevent violence and arson attacks.  They were chasing the onlookers away.  I went to the party head office and instructed the volunteer activists to keep the office closed and come back when things settle down.

While traveling along the Kandy Road I witnessed many more incidents of savagery and brutality.  People armed with swords and iron bars stopped my car at a junction on Kandy Road just in front of the Ceylon Tyre Corporation, Kelaniya.  One asked me to say 'Baldiya' aloud to which I obliged.  Because I am a Sinhalese they did not attack me but decided to remove petrol from my car.  Fortunately one person in the crowd identified me and told others to let me go.  The group stopped emptying petrol tank half-way and asked me to leave.  While all this was happening I could see from my own eyes the carnage and atrocities committed by the crowd.  After stopping lorries they looted all goods transported by them, moved all goods into other vehicles, set lorries ablaze and people who traveled in the lorries were also set on fire.  I saw heavy fireballs rising by the side of the road.  I was travelling home along Kiribathgoda Mawaramandiya road when a CTB depot service truck full of people brandishing swords and crowbars was approaching from the Mawaramandiya side.  They were looking at my car and threatened me to stop.  When I stopped they got down from the truck and were coming towards me in droves scolding me in filth.  It was clear that they had assumed that I was a Tamil fleeing Colombo.  I started yelling back at them in Sinhala saying that they are a mad lot of people.  When they understood that I was a Sinhalese, they went back to their truck and proceeded towards Colombo.

I went home and spend the day with my family.  When I went back to the Party office the next day I could gauge the colossal devastation caused by the riots.  Many party members came to the office and reported that it was mainly the UNPers who started the riots.  I went to inquire about the JVP activists of Tamil background who were at Narahenpita, Maradana and Kotahena.  Most of their houses had been attacked or burnt down and the activists had escaped during riots.  According to the reports I had from the Sinhala and Muslim party activists there had been people wearing security uniforms who went from place to place arousing people to take part in violence.  There had been Buddhist monks with electoral lists for identifying properties belonging to Tamils, who accompanied the perpetrators.  Most of these matters should be common general knowledge by now and I do not wish to dwell upon them.  Most of what I had to say would have been in the statements recorded from me by ASP Mr Chandra Jayawardena, ASP CID and Mr Mohan Jayasuriya, IP CID.[10]

The reaction of the JVP to the riots was varied.  I have no doubt that the vast majority of the JVP members including its leadership had been sympathetic towards the innocent civilians who were subjected to the degrading and indignified treatment just because they were Tamils.  Immediately after the July riots Mr Wijeweera had left Colombo for his protection but I was not informed his whereabouts.  Probably he may have had his own reasons to do so.  However he had sent me a message through Mr Somawansa Amerasinghe[11] to go underground.  I told Mr Amerasinghe that I need to attend to certain party matters before taking a decision to leave Colombo.

Following the 1983 July riots, the government proscribed the JVP, the Communist Party of Sri Lanka (CPSL) and the Nava Sama Samaja Party (NSSP) on or about 31 July 1983.  On news media names of several leaders of the JVP including myself were broadcast as ‘wanted’.  I had consultations with many to find out how the situation would develop.  Mr Amerasinghe told me that as in 1971 there is a conspiracy by the UNP to eliminate the JVP.  I knew that would have been the opinion of Mr Wijeweera coming through him.  When I contacted the late Dr Colvin R de Silva, leader of the LSSP, late Mr Bernard Soyza and several prominent members of the LSSP hierarchy at the LSSP head office in the presence of Mr Amerasinghe, the advice I received was to flee Colombo and go underground.  At that point of time I was recollecting the advice I received, in March 1971, from late Mr Edmund Samarakkody, leader of the Revolutionary LSSP, when the then government implemented Part 3 of the Emergency Regulations empowering security forces to dispose of dead bodies without post mortem examination.  I could not make up my mind to flee Colombo because I had not taken part in any activity against Tamils and I also knew that if I went underground there would be no opportunity for me to clear up the name of the JVP.  I decided to stay in Colombo.  Since then, I never had the occasion to meet Mr Wijeweera.

On or about 1 August 1983 IP of Kadawatha took into custody, from several houses belonging to the UNP supporters in and around Ihala Biyanwila, vast amounts of commodities from ransacked Tamil shops in Colombo.  One of the houses was only few hundred yards away from where I was living.  The IP wanted another vehicle and asked for my assistance.  I took him in my car but did not divulge my name because I was on the wanted list of the government.  On or about 2nd of August, I was taken into custody at my home on the basis of a detention order made by the Colonel C A Dharmapala, former Secretary to the Ministry of Defence under Emergency Regulations.  After searching the whole house the officers of the CID took into custody the Constitution of Sri Lanka (!!), several magazines dealing with foreign trade and philosophy, an audio cassette containing Sangeetha Visharada Nanda Malini's lullabies.  The place of detention was said to be Negombo Prison but I was never detained there.  I was held incommunicado at the first and fourth floors of the Criminal Investigations Department in New Secretariat Building in Colombo.

6.5 Offers of privileges and material benefits

I was taken to Mr Amarasena Rajapakse, Director CID who insisted to accept that the JVP was behind the riots and that President Jayawardena is willing to provide privileges and material benefits of the highest order if I am ready to provide evidence against the JVP.  In fact he was willing to take me to meet the President.  I made a decision that despite the differences I had with the leadership of the JVP it was not the time for retribution, but as the General Secretary it was my responsibility and duty to defend all what the JVP stood for and all those who supported the JVP.

I did not have the slightest doubt in my mind that neither the JVP nor the other proscribed parties would have engaged in such savagery and racial hooliganism against Tamils in the South.  I informed Mr Rajapakse of the information I had collected on riots and requested him to arrest the Hon. Ministers, Buddhist monks and others whom according to my information allegedly led riots against the Tamil people.  Seeing no success in his effort I was handed over to Mr Chandra Jayawardena, ASP CID.  From the statements of Mr Jayawardena it was clear that he had an anti-JVP bias but never attempted to implicate anybody unnecessarily.  While we were held in detention the propagandists of the UNP and news media carried out false news items linking us to many fictitious events and made many allegations against us.

To stay incommunicado was not a pleasant experience, especially when my newborn daughter was only six months old.  It will be worthwhile to mention some of my experiences I gained while in detention.  One day certain CID officers had arrested a Tamil youth of the plantation sector for selling a registered newspaper.  Having brought him to the fourth floor he was questioned in Sinhala.  His fingernails were crushed with rifle butt.  I was horrified to witness such events because many Sinhala JVP activists received the same treatment at the hands of the Police and CID in 1970 when they were selling in public the registered JVP newspapers.  On another occasion ASP Jayawardena was back from a visit to a detention camp in Vavuniya where suspect Tamil youth had been held.  When I was taken for questioning I saw that he was in a sad mood.  I asked him what has happened.  He said that he was horrified by what he had seen the previous day at the Vavuniya detention camp.  He told me that many Tamil youth had their sex organs cut off and some had their chests and stomachs slit open.  Having undergone torture and trauma in the period of 1971-1977 this news were retraumatising me.  Many IPs and some ASPs of the CID were investigating into the so-called JVP involvement in July riots and some of them were clearly seen to be politically partisan with the government.  We were neither allowed to access any legal advice nor to see any family members for a long time.

Another interesting development was the attempt (clearly on instructions that had come from the top) to incriminate several prominent national artistes including Sangeetha Visharada Nanda Malinee by introducing their names into the statement obtained by the CID.  This vile attempt was to detain them under the Emergency Regulations.  I withstood my ground and prevented the attempt to ruin the professional careers of several prominent national artistes.

With me were detained late Mr Somaratne Kaluarachchi, Treasurer and Politbureau member of the JVP, Mr Satyapala Wannigama, Lecturer at Ruhuna University and Human Rights Activist, who was made to disappear after arrest in 1987[12], Mr Viraj Fernando, Electrical Engineer, Dr Athula Sumathipala, Dr Nihal Abeysinghe, Dr P D Yapa, Mr Lalith Chandrasiri, Electrical Engineer, Mr Vijitha Ranaweera, JVP organiser of Tangalle, Mr J Pathinayake, lecturer at the University of Colombo and Mr Dharmadhasa Perera, JVP member.[13]  Many investigators including Mr Chandra Jayawardena treated us with respect but two investigators had threatened some detenues.  One threatened to break the other leg of Mr Pathinayake who had one leg already damaged by an accident and was using crutches to walk around.  Also detained with us were Mr Prins Gunasekera, President Sri Lanka Vimukthi Balawegaya and Secretary Human Rights Organisation, Mr Manik de Silva, distributor of pharmaceuticals and planter, Retired Army Captain Prasanna Dahanayake and a brother of 'Sotthi Upali' from Kirulapona whom many believed to be actually involved in the riots and looting of Tamil property but he was a supporter of the Sri Lanka Mahajana Party (SLMP).

At the investigation it was put to me that several members of the SLMP including late Mr Deva Bandara Senaratne and some leading members of the CPSL had implicated the JVP in July riots.  However within several weeks into the investigation the main CID team was more than convinced of our innocence.  However at the insistence of the UNP leadership we were continued to be detained.  Detenues of other left parties were released and proscription of their parties were lifted.  The JVP proscription remained.  Afterwards the investigation did become nothing but a political witch hunt against the JVP.  Mr Mohan Jayasuriya, IP CID continued to offer more privileges and material benefits to turn JVPers for supporting the government but the attempt was not successful.  Meanwhile analysis by the CID of the statistics of those arrested in relation to the riots clearly indicated that the JVP as an organisation was not involved in the riots.  My wife, Chitra Bopage filed an application for orders in the nature of writs of certiorari quashing detention orders and Habeas Corpus directing that I be produced before the Court of Appeal.  I wish to express my gratitude to late Mr Nimal Senanayake President Bar Association who appeared free of charge with Mr Saliya Mathew, Mrs A B Dissanayake, Miss A D Telespha and Mr R Jayendran in the case when it was first heard on 15th December 1983 and all detenues were released on 19th of December.

6.6 Dilemma of the JVP

Late Mr Wijeweera did not agree to surrender to the security forces.  He wanted the proscription of the JVP be lifted for him to come forward to make a statement to the CID.  My endeavour to bring the JVP to open politics by expressing the interest of the JVP to take part in government initiated all party conferences on the national problem and to contest Minneriya bye-election were totally unsuccessful.  Given the baseless allegations of the then UNP government against the JVP and rumours and statements by some CID officers that Mr Wijeweera would be killed if arrested, it is understandable that Mr Wijeweera did not believe that there would be a fair opportunity to prove his innocence.  A range of other issues such as prevailing emergency regulations and the lack of independence of the judiciary[14] may have also contributed to his decision not to surrender.  The government meanwhile made use of this situation to shamelessly propagandise that Mr Wijeweera ‘proves’ his guilt by remaining underground.

After my release I became active in the JVP politics for a short while, until the issues on which I had basic disagreements with the JVP confronted me again.  During this period, I met Mr Menikdiwela Secretary to President and Mr Perera (or Mr Silva?) additional Secretary to the President and continued to request to lift proscription of the JVP.  Through Mr Perera (or Mr Silva?) I met President Jayawardena and requested lifting proscription of the JVP and permission to service printing machines at Shakthi press at Kohilawatta, Angoda and JVP vehicles to be released from custody for maintenance work.  President Jayawardena was adamant that until Mr Wijeweera was found he would not attend to any request.  In January 1984, I conveyed this message to Mr Wijeweera through the Politbureau members of the JVP.  They did not agree with my request and conveyed that Mr Wijeweera would also not agree to surrender.  However they needed me to convince certain other members of the JVP hierarchy, who had resigned due to differences similar to mine, to become politically active again.  The result was my complete departure from the JVP and Galle District Development Council in February 1984[15].  However, political obstinacy of both parties was destroying the democratic traditions to which the JVP was accustomed so far.

7. Political backdrop – 1984 onwards

If the former UNP government and President Jayawardena had fulfilled their responsibility by holding a proper investigation into the 1983 July riots, the JVP would have extended its full cooperation during the 1983-1984 period.  This would have provided a golden opportunity for reconciling the peoples of Sri Lanka that had torn apart as a result of the ethnic and political divide.  Not only the country lost that opportunity but the decisions of President Jayawardena and the UNP government to destroy the JVP militarily by driving it underground, drowned the whole country in a bloodbath.  The decisions were solely made for the purpose of retaining political power in the hands of the UNP.  It is unfortunate that a holistic analysis of their convoluted political decision-making process has not been carried out in any of the documented research.[16]

Not only President Jayawardena failed to address the nation for six days after the commencement of 1983 July riots but did not take any effective measures to control riots (for example, imposition of curfew) until the evening when the city had been burning since morning.  Whole sequence of events since 1982 clearly points in the direction of President Jayawardena and the UNP government been responsible for the savage violence that occurred in July 1983 incurring murder and torture of many hundreds of Tamils and damage to their property.

By driving the JVP leadership underground, the UNP and President Jayawardena were able to make the District Court of Colombo reject the plaint on referendum filed by the JVP and dismiss the action when the case was taken up on 9th September, 8th Novemeber, 22nd November and 5th December 1983 consecutively.  Also by creating the spectre of a JVP conspiracy, President Jayawardena was able to convince the late Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to send Indian troops to the North East of Sri Lanka in 1987.  This was in order to deploy Sri Lankan security forces in the south of the country to crush the strength of the JVP as a political force.  To destroy the JVP politically, President Jayawardena with the assistance of Hon. Minister Lalith Athulathmudali were offering special privileges and material benefits to many prominent JVPers and to people like me who had already left the JVP.  This political torture of offering special privileges and material benefits continued until I left Sri Lanka in July 1989 and I have no doubt that this was an attempt to turn activists into a fifth column within the JVP itself.  When these overtures did not succeed the next step was to militarily eliminate the JVP.  President Jayawardena and the UNP government did not uphold the Constitution and preserve the sovereignty of Sri Lankan peoples by adopting the processes that were adopted since 1982.

8. Terror tactics and objective judgement

In times of conflict and war people's perceptions change.  We cannot judge viewpoints and actions in times of conflict and war from a peacetime perspective because it negates the reality as experienced in times of conflict.  I do not wish to disregard this reality. On the one hand the successes of the security forces in its operations and actions of terror against the JVP in late 1980s would have been driven by the politico-military leadership prejudiced against socialist ideology propagated by the JVP.  Most of the Sandhurst trained top hierarchy of the security forces also acquired anti-socialist ideology during the cold war period with prominence given to anti-Communist elimination strategies.  It is necessary to consider the perception of the UNP government and members of the security forces in terms of perceived threats against their social class, consider what conditions prevailed when those decisions were taken, when orders were given and who carried out those orders.

On the other hand the operations of the JVP were in their own way aimed at establishing a better Sri Lanka because the governments did not take steps to provide leadership in achieving fairness, justice and dignity for its peoples.  In this submission I do not attempt to debate the justification of the use of terror by the JVP at the end of the 1980s.  In the process of resistance the JVP’s sight would have been set on every aspect of life to terrorise the government in all possible ways.  The mobilisation of the population against the existing system would have become of great significance.  Therefore understanding the reality of the context when terror takes place is crucial in gaining insight into the actions carried out during that time.  Objective judgement is impossible without it.

It is necessary to try and determine the attitudes and perceptions that prevailed at a given time in the past to determine the cause of certain actions carried out both by the JVP and the security forces.  Some of the statements and activities of the past may sound bitterly unreal, but that was the reality then.  In the light of that reality, the activities of the JVP and the security forces must be respectively judged against their perceptions and fears of that time.

9. Use of terror tactics

The UNP regime, as elected government at that time, was responsible for ensuring security, maintaining law and order, preventing crime, bringing criminals to book and defending the territory and sovereignty of the peoples.  But they utterly failed in fulfilling their duties and responsibilities.  For instance, why did the Police and the security forces allowed mobs and racist thugs to behave in such an ugly manner in 1983?  Or were the political orders given by President Jayawardena violated the general principle of maintaining law and order?  If members of the Police and security forces acted unlawfully during the 1983 riots, the government could have taken immediate action to punish those officers and to offer unqualified apologies to innocent victims.  Instead President Jayawardena in his much delayed address to the nation after riots, threatened Tamils with more reprisals.[17]  Since then large numbers of people belonging to the civilians, policemen, security forces, vigilante groups, the JVP, Tamil militant groups have been killed or died as a result of attacks.[18]  What a waste of human life?  What shame on the political leaderships who were directly responsible for those crimes?

10. Morality of the conquerer

When we look back on periods of conflict during peacetimes, we are astounded that humans can act against other humans with such brutality and cruelty.  Many actions appear inexplicable and morally difficult to justify.  World history is full of selective morality where conquerer’s side is considered to have done all good and those defeated and conquered have done all evil.  For example, establishment of the very first concentration camps in the world by the British during the Anglo-Boer war is not considered the precursor to the Nazi concentration camps?  In those British camps tens of thousands of innocent women and children were incarcerated and died but this act is not considered a crime against humanity.  When Allied Forces bombed Germany so many innocent women and children were killed, though this process contributed to the downfall of Hitler.  The USA launched world's first nuclear bombs against the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in an attempt to end the conflict in the Far East.  The selective morality of the conqueror does not consider that approximately tens of thousands of innocent children died in the nuclear explosions.

However, one cannot forget the background against which such horrible acts were committed.  The Police and the security forces are creatures of the Constitution and as such are bound by the provisions of other repressive legislation such as emergency regulations and prevention of terrorism act.  The sound judgement of each side would have suffered during the heat of the battle, owing to the abhorrence generated by the deeds of terror committed by their opponents.

If moral blame is to be attached to the 'lawful' search and destroy strategies of the security forces, such blame must be leveled also at the political leaders of former governments.  Also there may be instances where individual members of the security forces exceeding the orders given to them by their higher-ups or political masters.  Furthermore, there is individual responsibility on the part of security personnel to judge on their own whether or not the orders they receive fall within the purview of the international and domestic law relating to war situations.  In The Hague, officers of the security forces have been tried at the War Crimes Tribunal for carrying out orders of the higher-ups that violated international law.

I hope that the members of the previous governments in all honesty and sincerity will be prepared to accept their collective moral and political responsibility for the actions of the security forces and the vigilante groups as a whole during the armed conflict with the JVP.  Military leaders who gave orders for carrying out unlawful actions which were clearly above the law and partisan in politics should also claim responsibility for their actions.  On the other hand, the JVP on their part should look back self-critically and in all honesty and sincerity, accept their collective moral and political responsibility for the violent actions carried out under the instructions of their leadership.

Until all sides are willing to do this there could not be any genuine reconciliation of the peoples of Sri Lanka.

11. Inappropriate actions

During the half century since independence the political leadership of Sri Lanka has not taken effective steps that are necessary and essential for removing discrimination based on the grounds of race, caste, religion, class, gender and political opinion.  The government has to realise the need to create an appropriate social, political and legal environment in the country to prevent such discrimination against its own peoples.  Today the requirement that all human rights apply equally to all Sri Lankans irrespective of their background has become significant than ever before.  Though non-discriminatory clauses are stipulated in some aspects of the present Constitution, discriminatory practices have been universal.  Filing legal action against such discriminatory practices has been extremely expensive, out of reach for the general public and takes extended periods of time to resolve.

Sri Lanka and its peoples are still involved in a long-drawn out conflict.  It is a unique conflict situation where one cannot see parallels in the rest of the world though we could use positive experiences of many other conflicts to assist resolving our conflict.  In the current conflict brutal onslaughts are carried out on each other utilising both conventional and unconventional warfare.  People are dismembered alive, bombs explode in public places, political and military leaders of all sides are eliminated, innocent people including women and children get killed and sometimes entire villages and cities including all living beings are destroyed.  The sight of dead and mutilated people has become so common.  The psychological effects and social repercussions of the onslaught has become clearly visible in the community.  Examples are leaping crime rate and the youth suicide rate which is the highest in the world.

Apparently the Government believes that it has no alternative but to stop perpetrators of violence at all costs.  The government seems to think the killing of innocent civilians could be prevented in this manner.  The destruction of those who carry out acts of terror, their bases and their capability has become the mission and has been the policy of the government for a long time.  However, in this process the security forces, vigilante groups and the government do use the same strategies and tactics the perpetrators of violence use.  I should mention here the multiple aerial bombardments on cities and villages, elimination of political and military leaders, extensive use of land mines, using civilians as human shields, carrying out savage acts of torture and terror on whoever is caught or arrested and destruction of them afterwards, by all parties to the conflict.

All sides are entirely focused at the destruction of their respective opponent (s).  It is not a perception and approach of one side only.  These actions during a time of conflict and war are in no way strange or exceptional.  Such actions have been performed internationally throughout the centuries.  Organisations such as the USA's CIA, Israel’s Mossad, UK’s MI5, Russia's KGB, Pakistan’s ISD, India’s RAW, Sri Lanka’s STF and RDF and security organisations in other countries operate in this manner.  Similarly most militant groups plan and destroy their opponents in a similar manner.

The State must responsibly ensure that such actions do not occur at least during peaceful situations.  However in countries like Sri Lanka the reality is that such actions happen during peaceful times; or incidents are created to take inappropriate and unjustifiable measures which cannot be normally carried out during peaceful times.  War is waged on individuals and groups and people die even before declaring war.  This is a situation with its own rules, perceptions and morality.  Governments speak as little as possible about it.  This type of action cannot be condoned.  And this is what exactly happened in July 1983 riots.  It was a creation of the then government to take inappropriate and unjustifiable action against the JVP and Tamil militant groups.

12. Lasting reconciliation

In approaching the issue of reconciliation and nation-building, it is critical to appreciate the fact that human rights violations did originate with colonialism and evolved to the current extent during the last five decades since the independence.  Under all circumstances special privileges, oppression and exclusion result in the revolt of the oppressed at the first opportunity available.  The oppressive state then resorts to force to maintain its unjust rule.  Repressive regimes are needed to prop up doctrines of racial superiority, pursuit of narrow interests and special privileges for any one family, class, religion, language or race all premised on the exclusion of the majority of Sinhala, Tamil, Muslim and other peoples.

The discriminatory regime against its vast majority of peoples and its violent consequences are not an aberration by a few individuals or groups.  It has been systematic, deliberate and a matter of policy.  Over the years, a system of government has been built in which there is no accountability and transparency; security considerations and military operations are given the highest priority.  These circumstances resulted in curtailing individual and group rights of all peoples.

Therefore, the basic premise in correcting those historical injustices is for the majority of Sri Lankans to pay allegiance to developing, with appropriate consultation and without harming the interests and rights of individuals and groups, a democratic constitution and a culture of tolerance, respect, fairness, equality and dignity of individuals and groups that goes with the constitution.  The civic society has to take responsibility of promoting and utilising to the maximum effect the rights that have been attained, and ensure that transparent and accountable government becomes the realpolitic.

During the past several years there were occasions when many individuals both local and expatriate, including religious personalities utilising radio, television and other newsmedia regularly spreading anti-Tamil and anti-Muslim propaganda among Sinhala people.  I believe there are similar currents creating anti-Sinhala propaganda among Tamil people both local and expatriate.  This is freedom of expression one would say!  Of course, in many countries there is freedom to express their opinion on any matter.  However, that freedom is seldom used to rouse feelings of racial hatred against another community of people.  With freedom comes responsibility.  If one does arouse racial hatred against another community without factual evidence severe penalties could be imposed.  And I consider Sri Lanka should develop a system of press freedom that values diversity of a multicultural society.  It is not media censorship that I propose but responsible reporting by media.  Editors of newspapers should be held responsible for what they say and report and they should not make use of media freedom to create racial and cultural hatred for the sake of gaining more profits at the cost of humanity by sensationalizing day to day events.

13. Conclusion

I believe the group who led 1983 riots behind the scene, used the incident of 13 soldiers killed in Jaffna as a pretext to launch their pre-meditated racist plan of violence.  In my opinion, the government and President Jayawardena expected an exodus of Tamils from the south to the North East would occur when Tamils in the south are attacked as planned.  Because of the loss of revenue and business activities Tamils based in the south would force Tamil militants to curtail their struggle for a separate state, they would have believed.  I am of the opinion that this plan went out of control when other racist elements, common criminal elements and people who struggle to survive under difficult circumstances joined in the prey.  Said racist plan of violence was also used as a pretext for repressing the JVP and driving it underground.

With the aim of bringing about justice, reconciliation and unity of all peoples the Commission is faced with the critical task of determining political responsibility, political and military operational commands and lines of accountability, and the individuals who carried out specific acts of gross violation of human rights during the period being inquired into.

Truth Commission can only promote reconciliation if it treats all parties to and the parties affected by the riots and the aftermath of riots, on an equal basis.  Also the Commission should respect their equality before the law.  In my opinion, without accepting the bona fides of all parties to the conflict, reconciliation will not be feasible.  I sincerely hope that the determinations of the Truth Commission would not create perceptions of prejudice and intolerance and would not generate another political witch-hunt leading to aggravation of chaos.  A tremendous responsibility lies with the Commission to contribute to a brighter future for the greater benefit of the future generations of Sri Lanka.

Justice is not revenge or retribution.  It is not only punishment.  It demands that the concerns of victims of violence should take prominence in the process of reconciliation.  There are thousands of families who have suffered in so many ways during the 1983 riots.  They could justifiably demand that they should be compensated for the harm caused by the violence.  I understand that the government has already taken certain measures to address this issue.  Still there are some victims whose problems have not yet been addressed.  Their appeals have gone unheard.  In my opinion, the Truth Commission in making its recommendations should take this situation also into account.

It is for all in the civil society to promote and protect equal individual and collective rights disregarding caste, race, colour, religion, language and other differences.  And it is for all Sri Lankan peoples to work together to build a better life for all; a Sri Lanka where there is room for all of us and our grandchildren to live in dignity, fairness, peace and prosperity.  The country is still involved in conflict, violence and bloodshed.  Not only exposing the evil actions that have been committed and investigating the reasons why such actions occurred but also the restoration of the dignity of the victims and the humanity of the perpetrators are required to achieve unity and reconciliation of all peoples.  The past is history and we cannot recreate it or change it.  Sri Lanka cannot build its future by recreating its past.  What is done today determines Sri Lanka’s future.  I believe that peoples of Sri Lanka will become wiser, and better able to march into the future with confidence in one another.  Then the past gone by will become only fading memories.  Sri Lanka should not let its past destroy its future!

14. Recommendations

I would like to forward following recommendations for the attention of the Truth Commission:

1.      Development of a new Constitution enshrining the principles of fairness, equality, dignity, justice and unity of all peoples of Sri Lanka, with an appropriate preamble for correctly interpreting its clauses in the context of the future vision of reconciliation and unity laid down by the preamble.  Decisions of the highest executive should also be subject to the scrutiny of the normal legal process.

2.      Recognition of individual and collective rights of peoples of Sri Lanka in the new constitution.  Decentralisation of power and equality of access to opportunities and resources should become a key feature of the new constitution.  Inclusivity rather than exclusivity should be its prominent characteristic.

3.      Development of adequate measures to ensure that the personnel in the public service, security, judiciary, election commission and education perform their duties to the people in an apolitical manner.  Apolitical bodies should monitor their performance.  In the provision of services their performance should be guided by timeliness and efficiency indicators incorporated in codes of ethics and customer service charters.  Privacy acts and freedom of information legislation should ensure transparency and accountability of their performance.  Also it is necessary to ensure that their performance is appropriately and adequately rewarded.

4.      Withdrawal or extreme curtailment of excessive powers given to security forces, the Police, para-military and vigilante groups.  Their day to day performance should be strictly monitored by an independent human rights commission and reported to the House of Representatives.  As an urgent measure, legislation providing the Executive the authority to delegate excessive power to the security forces should be withdrawn or appropriately curtailed.

5.      Development of an anti-discriminatory legislative framework that allows for the establishment of special institutions for resolving cases of discrimination within strict time limits stipulated by law.[19]  This legislation should deal with discrimination based on caste, race, religion, language, gender, disability and political opinion.  Institutions established under this law should also be empowered to arbitrate and resolve issues of equal opportunity.  The institutions should have not only the power of arbitration but also power to impose punitive measures.  Decisions of such institutions should be binding and may be appealed through the normal justice system and within strict time limits.

6.      Establishment of an additional Code of Practice on anti-discrimination for the private sector, with the government rewarding private organizations implementing model anti-discriminatory practices.

7.      Extension of the application of anti-discriminatory legislation to political organisations and body corporates including private and government newsmedia.  Organisations of any nature, both secular and non-secular, disseminating racist propaganda and arousing feelings of racial and/or religious hatred of one people against another thus destabilising the unity among peoples of Sri Lanka should be banned and made punishable by law.  Leaders of such organisations and individuals engaging in such actions should be brought to justice and appropriately and publicly humiliated.  Parliamentarians and politicians of all persuasions should adopt and sign a Code of Practice ensuring that they will never make use of divisive issues such as caste, race, language and religion for the purpose of achieving political power.

8.      Declaration by the Truth Commission, the government, or another investigative body that the JVP, the NSSP, the LSSP, the CPSL and their members detained in 1983 who were alleged to have been involved in the riots are innocent victims of a political witch-hunt.  This will help relieving the psychological trauma, the victims of political witch hunt have been undergoing so far and restoring the dignity, honour and the good names of those victims.

9.      Provision of monetary compensation and/or other forms of material assistance, psychological support, provision of comfort and solidarity to the families and/or children who had become victims of the 1983 riots and the political witch-hunt that followed.

10.  Organisation as a collective effort by the Government, community organisations and the civil society festivals celebrating diversity of all peoples of Sri Lanka.  Government awards for multicultural literary work and performing art could be incorporated with diversity celebrations.

11.  Active involvement of most of the population as individuals and organizations in the process of reconciliation and unity of people.

12.  Gradually making English the link language and a compulsory subject of school study and provision of adequate facilities for teaching English at all schools.  The department of education should closely monitor social science studies, in particular, history education by training all history teachers to promoting ideas of equality, dignity, justice, reconciliation, inclusivity and unity of people and to teach various interpretations of history from different perspectives.

13.  Appointment of people with integrity and no direct involvement in partisan politics as leaders of the security forces and the public service.  All appointments, promotions and transfers within the public service, in particular, within the judiciary, security forces and the Police should be based on merit and not based on any other factors.

14.  Making a public apology by the government in power to the victims of 1983 riots and racial hatred.  This will serve as a preliminary goodwill gesture of reconciliation.

This list of recommendations is not exhaustive.  It will be pertinent for the government to prolong the duration of the Truth Commission with the power to intervene on an urgent basis at any time the Commission may deem appropriate.  Especially when implementing its recommendations for alleviating the plight of victims, assisting restoration of their dignity and honour, ending the humiliation and making them feel that reconciliation and justice has not been at their expense.

I thank you for this opportunity again.

Lionel Bopage

15 October 2001



[1]  “Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution” by Rohan Gunaratne (1990) in Chapter 8 discusses these versions.  It appears that his research is one-sided and based only on information provided by individuals and/or authorities of the defence establishment, which makes his presentations one-sided and at times completely inaccurate.  For example, slogans attributed to the JVP May Day demonstrations, selective nature of presenting speeches made by JVP leaders and media releases etc.

[2]  I resigned from the positions of General Secretary and the member of the Politbureau of the JVP in

February 1984.

[3]   A limited disclosure of those responsible for 1983 July riots, according to the information I had received as the General Secretary JVP, was recorded during my detention during August-December 1983 period by Mr Chandra Jayawardena, then ASP CID.

[4]  This was a major policy position adopted by the JVP in its first policy declaration that came into being in 1974 (not in print) and made available to the general public in print form later in 1978.  A complete explanation of what this policy position meant was recordedby Mr Chandra Jayawardena, ASP CID.

[5]  Rohan Gunaratne provides an incomplete list with inaccurate information in his book “Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution” at page 197.

[6]  One was immediately after our unconditional release when the Criminal Justice Commissions Act was repealed by the new UNP government, the second was with regard to specialist treatment of late Rohana Wijeweera at the UK for his heart problems and the third was in January 1984 to request the President to lift the proscription of the JVP.

[7]  I was a member of the Executive Committee of the Human Rights Organisation

[8]  Action was filed on 2nd February 1983 against the Commissioner of Elections

[9]  Marxist Analysis of the National problem” (1977) by Lionel Bopage.  The JVP published this booklet at the Shakthi Press and JVP branch in London printed and distributed a summary in English in 1978.  However, in 1984 the JVP has allegedly instructed to destroy this booklet and use the new policy position of the JVP.  Later Mr Rohana Wijeweera authored a book titled “What is the solution to Tamil Eelam Struggle?” (1986) which became the JVP handbook for its current retrogressive policy on the national problem.

[10]  From 2nd August 1983 to 16th December 1983 with 22 others I was detained incommunicado at the CID headquarters in Fort, Colombo and statements were continuously recorded from all of us.  These statements will provide material evidence against the proscription of the JVP by the UNP.

[11]   The current Chairperson and leader of the JVP.

[12]  Amnesty International Report

[13] A copy of a letter written to President Jayawardena, to be sent through Director CID, on 18 December 1983 two days after our release is attached for reference.

[14]   Few days prior to the riots residences of three supreme court judges who deemed the arrest of an opposition member unconstitutional were attacked.

[15]  I did not agree with the JVP’s assessment of political situation.  In my letter of resignation to the JVP Politbureau I appealed the JVP leadership not to engage in any activity that would bring harm to the left movement and the people.  I could smell that some things were horribly moving in the wrong direction.

[16] Rohan Gunaratne provides an incomplete picture in his book “Sri Lanka: A Lost Revolution” at pp 187-199.

[17] President’s address to the nation immediately after the July riots

[18] Reports by Amnesty International and a number of other human rights organisations estimate around 40,000 people were killed or disappeared during 1987-91 and in the order of 60,000 have been killed in the war in the North East.

[19]  It will be appropriate for the Sri Lankan Public Service to adopt international best practice of public administration by adopting public service customer service charters with the active involvement of public servants.

No comments:

Post a Comment