PA-JVP Memorandum of Understanding
The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) will not be ultimately judged by its content alone. What it important is whether the MOU could offer viable solutions to physical suffering and psychological trauma undergone by the people of Sri Lanka. When history passes judgment on the performance of the MOU they will also judge the role the JVP played in achieving the outcomes of the MOU. Of course this is subject to condition that the MOU will last at least its proper one-year and there would not be complete breakdown of understanding between the People's Alliance (PA) and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).
By looking at various singular aspects of the MOU one would not be able to make a holistic assessment about its overall impact. In my opinion it is therefore necessary to look at the interdependency of singular aspects of the MOU.
Political-legal aspect
From a politico-legal aspect the binding clauses of the MOU are:
Clause 25 makes it “obligatory on the part of both parties to carry out severally and collectively” the agreements within the agreed time frames. Clause 2 (i) states that if the PA intends to take any policy decisions or courses of action outside of the agreements that conflict with or have an effect contrary to them, the PA agrees to obtain the prior concurrence of the JVP. Clause 25 also specifies that if any of the parties do not take steps “to carry out any or several items agreed to, within the specified time frames” and if it is not possible for one party to negotiate with the other party and arrive at an agreement by prior notice in writing, “both parties agree that either party shall have the right to withdraw” from the MOU.
In clause 2 (ii) and 24 (B) the JVP agrees “not to launch on any course of action that tends directly to destabilise or topple the PA Government” during the period and “to extend the necessary support to the continuance of the People's Alliance Government with stability”. In clause 24 (C) the JVP agrees “not to support any subversive line of action to be adopted by other parties that may result in paralysing the government and the economy”. Furthermore, in Clause 24 (A) the JVP agrees to extend necessary support to the PA in Parliament on all occasions to sustain a stable government during the period (my emphasis).
In my opinion, clause 24 ties down the JVP in its entirety. If the government, in its interpretation of the JVP activities, is of the opinion that the JVP is “not supportive” to sustain a stable government then the PA can withdraw and pursue the JVP politically and militarily for taking a “subversive line”. There is nothing new here that differs from the deceptive ruling political strategy. These circumstances subject the JVP to be on probation during the period of the MOU than the government. In other words, the JVP will have to act as a political prop on all occasions to the PA government, and will play a subservient role to the PA in the partnership during the period of probation.
During the latter part of the 1960s the JVP filled the political vacuum created by the traditional left political parties when they competed with each other and became political props to the two major capitalist political parties, the SLFP and the UNP. Whatever the way clause 25 is interpreted, in pragmatic reality, the possibility of the JVP becoming a political prop similar to the traditional left of Sri Lanka does exist. As I previously mentioned only the test of time will tell otherwise.
Democratisation of governance
In the aspect of democratisation of the governance of the country within bourgeois democratic norms, clauses 3-7 of the MOU require the PA immediately cancelling the Referendum, reconvening the Parliament, abolishing the executive presidency, vesting parliament with executive power and establishing a new electoral system within six months, establishing the Constitutional Council, the four independent commissions for the public service, judicial service, elections department and the police by October 5, establish independent media commission within six months and conducting a free and fair election under the new electoral system and a Care Taker Government. These commitments basically emanate from the pledges of the PA election manifesto of 1994 and the UNP led joint opposition demands since then. If optimism prevails then all these commitments will become reality within a year and it in itself will be a tremendous achievement. This compared with the political, economic and military crises the country would have undergone if the very same demands were to be achieved under a joint opposition government under the current President of the PA. In addition, clause 19 requires the PA to initiate “speedy measures to take into custody all illegal firearms” that are currently in the possession of individuals, organisations and underworld groups. Considering the aspect of bourgeois democratisation of the south of the country this is a ‘wishful’ commitment if it is achievable at all. I will further discuss this matter later in this article.
Economics
From an economics aspect, clauses 6-17 of the MOU commit the PA government to taking measures to prevent price hikes of essential goods and services essential and imposing, if required, price control to “a maximum possible extent”, withholding any future plans of privatising public or social property, entering into no new “trade agreements or financial agreements that could be detrimental to the interests of the country”, writing-off small-scale loans and looking into providing possible further relief to farmers, taking steps to investigate malpractices in the repayment of large scale business loans, finding short term solutions to problems of local industrialists and businessmen, axing salaries and perks of parliamentarians, reducing administrative costs of government, adopting steps to prevent fraud and corruption in government dealings and to implement labour laws congruent with the ILO convention. Economic rationalists and advocates of 100 percent free trade and market economy (not even made available in the developed world) may not agree with some of these measures but there is no doubt that this will be a lot if achieved in one year, if feasible. However there is another aspect of the MOU we have to consider in assessing the viability of these short-term politico-economic objectives.
Social
Again from a social aspect we need to look at the clauses relating to the national problem (some entities may use different terminology, but they could use their own terminology depending on their divisive affiliations). Relevant to this aspect are clause 7, relating to adopting an electoral system ensuring “reasonable representation of the will of all ethnic groups in Parliament”, clause 18 relating to a policy of transparency “to ensure that all appointments, promotions and transfers by the Government are effected without any discrimination with regard to nationality, religion, sex, party politics etc.”, clause 20 relating to not bringing “proposals for devolution of power or any other proposals that may lead to a controversy until such time that a broad consensus is arrived at through a wide-ranging dialogue with participation of all segments of the society aimed at reaching a reasonable resolution of the national question” and clause 21 relating to ameliorating “the living conditions of the people belonging to all communities who were reduced to destitution and are undergoing untold hardship due to the on-going war” and ensuring “the uplift of their social lives” (sic). Indeed from a lonely politico-social perspective these appear to be noble measures if achievable during the year.
The JVP agrees that all communities are “reduced to destitution and are undergoing untold hardship due to the on-going war”. Though this is accepted as a matter of fact, this is in the long term self-contradictory with the content of clause 20. This clause has already being differently interpreted by the PA and the JVP. Spokespersons of the JVP have repeatedly stated that this clause does not allow any form of discussions with the LTTE. They have further clarified their position later by stating that there cannot be any discussions until the LTTE drops its demand for a separate state. On the other hand, the President and the government spokespersons have repeatedly expressed the view that clause 20 does not prevent the government from initiating or holding discussions with the LTTE but it only prevents presenting any devolution package to the Parliament during the term, if the content of such a package is controversial and broad consensus of all segments of the society has not been achieved. From a legal point of view, the intent of clause 20 is clear and not ambiguous at all and the interpretation of the government is not in dispute and stands ahead of the interpretation of the JVP.
This leads us to another interesting issue. Epitomically speaking what the JVP stands for is explicit in clause 20 of the MOU. That is that the war should continue unabated and this position is vindicated by the position taken by the JVP that the LTTE has to be crushed militarily. The strategy of the government has been the continuation of war and therefore, in my opinion, it will not be hard for the JVP and the PA to come to an understanding with regard to how to continue the war. The MOU provides the government a license to conduct war with a non-hitherto seen ferociousness. Here I do not attempt to discuss whether the prolongation of war is fair or not but the implications this interpretation has on other clauses of the MOU.
Economic and financial feasibility
One can question the economic and financial feasibility of provision of loan relief to farmers. I have no doubt that this is feasible and achievable. In 1996, Sri Lankan war effort consumed the worth of Rs 200 billion. In 2001 this expenditure is definitely much more. It is realistic to state that the current war has become the driving force of uncontrollable corruption, privatisation of profitable government enterprises, losing business confidence, increasing economic burden on the people of the south, and unceasing destruction of the lives and property of the people of the north-east and the rest of Sri Lanka. In the current context war is the most decisive factor and it is the stark reality.
If outcomes of the individual aspects can be achieved then there is no doubt that it in itself will be a victory for the oppressed people of Sri Lanka. In this sense sole major outcomes of the process would be the democratisation of the governance of the country, providing economic relief to the people and treating peoples of diverse backgrounds fairly during the year. Combination of various aspects leads us to the following scenario:
National question
Let us start with the national question.
The LTTE has placed on the bargaining table its maximum demand, the separate state; the minimum demand appears to be a confederation or an equivalent federal system. The LTTE has clarified that the Sinhala side should come up with a viable alternative for it to drop the demand for a separate state. The government’s maximum offer on the table is a devolution package, the scope of which is not even clear to the President herself. The JVP is against not only separation but also any form of federation or devolution. The government was not capable of getting its own diluted devolution package through its own cabinet ranks though it retained some of the controversial features of the current constitution. In this context does the JVP expect the LTTE to come to the negotiating table? I do not believe so. The JVP understands this position very well. Therefore the war has to continue without an end and there is no doubt that the outcome of the war will continue to be a stalemate. Then how does the continuation of war affect achieving the targeted outcomes of the MOU?
The achievement of bourgeois democratisation is so far so good! Referendum abrogated, parliament reconvened, ministries reduced. But how can this democratisation be extended to the day to day lives of the ordinary people? Is a return to bourgeois democratic norm possible when there is a war imposed on a section of the people in the country? Believing that the war would not have any serious repercussions on the south of the country is nothing but political ignorance! Continuation of the war necessitates more and more purchases of war consumables and more and more war spending. More and more money has to be found which will in turn lead to increasing debt burden and increasing privatisation of government assets. Trauma on the ordinary people will become more and more intense. There is no war that is non-corrupt. When the LTTE attacks targets in the south freedoms of the people of the whole country get restricted with the enactment of repressive laws such as emergency regulations and prevention of terrorism act. Under such conditions what will happen to the bourgeois democracy the JVP is flagging around? What will be the real effect on the provision of relief measures to the downtrodden? Could they escape the fate of worsening burden, suffering and pain? Until and unless an end to this bloody war is sought and achieved no government whether it is capitalist or socialist can avoid commodity price hikes. What about the people in the north-east, who have been already displaced several times and crippled with economic and commodity sanctions?
Bourgeois democracy
Bourgeois democracy requires equal and dignified treatment, provision of equal opportunity based on merit in all spheres of socio-economic and political life and mutual respect for and celebration of diverse cultures. Though these are not fully practised in many countries of the developed world at least there is appropriate legal enactments that provide for seeking redress on issues of open and direct discrimination. When a certain section of people is demanding special privileges constitutionally provided in terms of opportunities and access to services how can a country achieve such bourgeois democratic norms? This has nothing to do with the "triumph of socialism". This is not a demand for an obsolete right of people! This is something that is being animatedly practised in many capitalist countries.
When combined with the politico-legal aspect, the position that the JVP is bound to support the government on all occasions to maintain stable government has very clear implications. Some of the objectives of the MOU can be achieved without any obstacle, and this is the positive aspect of the MOU. However the JVP through its signature has wholeheartedly pledged that it will provide its non-fragmented support to maintain political stability of the PA government in order to continue the war, to impose repressive legislation and to increase economic and financial burden on the people, at least during the term of the MOU. This position is and will be easily and continuously tested when the war escalates further. Government will re-impose emergency regulations and in the name of good democratic governance the JVP will provide stability by offering its ten parliamentary votes for the government. What a shame it would be and what an opportunistic turn of events it would represent! When a political party that has been fighting to abolish repressive legislation, that was twice subjected to repression under the emergency regulations, supports enacting of emergency regulations to repress other segments of the oppressed people of Sri Lanka!!
Let us examine the MOU further.
First Policy Declaration of the JVP
The first Policy Declaration of the JVP (1978) contains a major policy statement on the national question. It stated that the JVP would oppose autocratic centralisation and autocratic separation of the country. The JVP’s interpretation of clause 20 of the MOU runs counter to this fundamental policy position of the JVP. In fact this was a crystallisation of the JVP policy on the peoples’ right to self-determination. This policy stipulated the principle that no individual or organisation cannot autocratically impose either centralisation or separation on a people; people themselves have the democratic right to determine their own political destiny. The decision of a people will depend on relative circumstances they are faced and may change with time. A people who decided to separate at one stage may re-decide to live together with other people when the situation changes. This has happened in the former Soviet Union and may happen elsewhere. In South Africa the cry for separation died down with the acceptance of right to self-determination of the Zulu people and decentralisation of power. When we speak about power we speak about administration and management. Administration cannot be decentralised without decentralisation of power to implement policy decisions. This is the policy stand "one country, two systems", adopted by the People's Republic of China in administering Hong Kong.
The government has deployed the security forces and para-military groups in the war in the north-east, with the political aim of keeping the country under a "unitary" (not the same as "united") constitution. The JVP and Sinhala nationalist forces advocate keeping the current unitary status of the country as is because they oppose any kind of decentralisation of administration and/or power and/or resources. It is strange to note that at the same time they say they will empower working people. How can one achieve empowerment of working people by reinforcing the centralised bureaucracy and concentrating all the power in their hand! The LTTE and its para-military groups in the north-east are fighting with the political aim of creating a separate state or a united federal state, preferably, a confederation. The LTTE and other Tamil nationalist forces advocate a radical change to the current unitary status as they oppose centralisation of administration and/or power and/or resources.
Wish of the people in the north-east
No proper bourgeois democratic election has been held in the north and east of the country after 1977. Since then all elections were held at the gunpoint of either this party or that party. As a result, we have no proper indicator to assess the wish of the people living there. The only reasonable indicator that is useable is the results of the 1977 general election where vast majority of people overwhelmingly elected members of the TULF, who unequivocally advocated Tamil Eelam as the only way to address the problems of Tamils. The very same elected representatives of the Tamil people of the north-east were expelled in turn from the Parliament by the government by amending the “omnipotent” constitution after 1983.
Today we have no feasible way of determining the wish of the people of the north-east. One possibility is to have a referendum under a neutral body acceptable to all parties to the conflict, such as the United Nations or the Commonwealth of Nations (as was done in the East Timor!). To demand that there cannot be any talks until the LTTE gives up the demand for a separate state is nothing but an autocratic attempt to impose a national socialist (fascist) policy stand of the current JVP leadership on the people of the north-east. No bourgeois democrat can defend the anti-democratic measures and terror tactics used by the government forces, simply by hiding behind the anti-democratic acts and terror tactics used by the LTTE. The decision whether or not to support separation or whether or not to stay united with the rest of the people of Sri Lanka has to be a decision of the people of the north-east themselves, democratically expressed. A political solution to the current national question can be found only through a process of negotiated settlement involving all the parties to the conflict.
The JVP opposes initiating discussions with the LTTE; it opposes a dialogue on the national question; it rejects the peoples’ right to self-determination as a relative right and a politically obsolete principle; it provides political stability to a government continuing a policy of war against its own people. Therefore the JVP appears to be moving in strides in an opportunistic and retrogressive direction, in particular, with regard to the national question. If the MOU was signed in a spirit of decentralisation of power and resources leading to the empowerment of people of Sri Lanka, this MOU would have been considered one of the great attempts to restore norms of bourgeois democracy in the governance of the whole of Sri Lanka. But it is not and it is extremely unfortunate!
Let us look at the same issue from another angle!
If what is achievable through the MOU were to be achieved under the leadership of a joint opposition that would have led the country to an extremely chaotic and crisis-ridden situation. The Parliament would have had opposition in power while the Presidency of the PA wields overall executive power. In this sense the MOU is a pragmatic deal which prevented the country from slipping down to a worsened chaos and anarchy. Clause 2 (i) of the MOU provides flexibility allowing discussions between the PA and the JVP to overcome misunderstandings and obstacles on any substantive issue. However this flexibility could also be used by any one party to drag on discussions until the other party looses face in front of public opinion. Depending on how the two parties make use of this valuable flexibility remains to be seen.
There may be other factors involved in agreeing to this MOU known only to the JVP leadership itself. I have no factual material to dwell upon this aspect. But I would like to conclude by saying that if the foundation required to commence negotiations to end this bloody war cannot be laid down, then the land we were born will be pushed forward into higher states of anarchy!
Lionel Bopage
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