Letter of Resignation
To the Politburo, Central Committee and membership of the party, with fraternity,
I believe it will be more correct to state that I had contemplated writing this article approximately one year ago. From the onset it must be stated that despite the political reverberations I was subjected to, and despite the tactical and strategic errors and shortcomings of our politics, I consider that the protection of the relative correctness of our politics hence its revolutionary honour in front of the capitalist class was, and continue to remain my revolutionary duty. During the time period when I was under arrest I avoided writing and forwarding such an article because, after writing it, if it fell into the possession of the ruling class, the usefulness and advantage that they may derive, and the harm that would result, was of concern to me. I contemplated forwarding this letter after completing those tasks that I should and could have done to make the ban on the party be lifted and once again activate the party. But as, in addition to these tasks the party’s Politburo engaged me in other political activities; as a certain individual within the party in whom I had much trust and who had political questions parallel to mine but not so serious left the party over a series of problems; as, when those full timers who continue to work within the party despite having numerous questions discuss their questions with me. I am compelled to agree with their questions rather than solve them; as I do not believe that the party can be corrected on these issues; I have decided to forward this article to the party to place it before every comrade within the party.
I am aware of the harmful effects that can be caused by the facts contained in this article both to me personally and collectively to the party; as well as the reactions that may arise within the comrades on account of this article. It should be clarified that by writing this article I am not attempting to protect myself by laying the blame on the shoulders of others, and that collectively as a member and to a greater extent as a “leader” of the party I must be held responsible.
During my political life, I have come to two very serious and faulty political conclusions. The first refers to my decision at the discussion held to decide whether or not to embark on the 1971 insurrection. I cannot escape from my responsibility in all the consequences that ensued following the discussion on 2nd April whereby the Sanath - Athula group forced upon us their initial decision to launch an attack on 5th April. Actually, irrespective of whether this decision was taken to confront the repression of the State and ensure the existence of the party, and irrespective of whether this was a suicidal decision, if one perceives this decision as a logical outcome of our pre-1971 activities, how this decision could have been altered is a question that was, and continues to remain unresolved.
Needless to say, I am well aware that this decision was a destructive one and that I was wholeheartedly involved in it. I have already indicated to the party that as a result of this I was subjected to a strong political crisis of a personal; nature, and that this situation has caused within me serious repercussions when taking a grave political decision. Although I contemplated that after rebuilding the party, correcting the former errors and shortcomings, avoiding similar faulty political conclusions, ensuring that the harm caused by the trust and faith that I held in individuals prior to 1971 is not repeated, and reversing the destructive situation created in the past that I must quit politics; in re-engaging in politics after coming out of prison in 1977, collectively working even within the political tendencies that I disliked, I once again became party to a serious and faulty political conclusion not dissimilar to the decision made in 1971.
That is, the strong support and accordance that I gave to the decision to put forward comrade Rohana as Presidential candidate at the l982 Presidential election. If amidst our comrades, at the “Congress" held in Kandy I had opposed the proposal to put forward comrade Rohana as the Presidential candidate it would have been possible to negatively influence that proposal. Although comrade Rohana privately conferred with me and asked me not to give my support for his nomination, my assessment of the subject then was that the logical conclusion of our politics hitherto engaged in is none other than to nominate him for the Presidential Election. Considering our political strategy, one cannot say that if the Presidential Election were not contested the political repercussions that would have befallen our party would have been less harmful. Regardless of the context in which this decision was taken, by seconding the motion to put forward Rohana as a candidate for the Presidential Election on that day I gave my support to the destructive destiny the party is subjected to today. Today it is my belief that just as the decision made on 2nd April, 1971 was the end resu1t of our previous political activities, the decision to nominate comrade Rohana for the 1982 Presidential Election was the inevitable logical conclusion of our hitherto practiced politica1 activities. While thus once again becoming involved in a serious and faulty political conclusion which, in terms of its destructive repercussions is not second to that made in 1971, the political reverberation brought about by the decision made on 2nd April, 1971, even though alleviated during the party’s First Congress, by my involvement the political rumblings grew into disillusionment and ineffectiveness.
Although as an individual I was personally involved in two serious political errors, collectively as a member of the party I have been involved in additional political errors which cannot be considered to be less serious.
I have always acted in obedience to the majority decision of the party’s Central Committee. It must be noted that while constantly seeking to clarify my instance, when I held different views, on occasions I have not opposed certain decisions of the central Committee although I was not in agreement with those decisions. This occurred either because I was unable to put forward alternative lines of action or because of lack of knowledge on my part. Throughout my life a very harmful personality trait of mine has been to remain silent on certain subjects with which I disagreed. Yet I am aware that by remaining within the party’s process I will be creating serious harm. Therefore this cannot continue further.
Although we have yet been unable to put forward an in depth self-criticism of the 1971 insurrection, while being held in prison and at the self-criticism which I prepared for the party’s First Congress, certain mistakes and shortcomings that I saw regarding the 1971 insurrection had often not been noted by other comrades within the party; or else, they claimed that such mistakes never occurred. Today I am aware that rather than correcting these errors they have intensified further. It is not necessary for me to debate this. I strongly feel that what is noted in my mind through time and practice cannot be changed either through mere debate or argument, and that doing so will waste all our time, serve no aim and have no outcome.
I believe you can recall that on the night of 2nd November, 1977 (the day of our release from prison) at the residence of comrade M.B. Ratnayake I strongly opposed the voluminous publicity campaign which comrade Rohana forwarded to the then Politburo, but to which I adhered to as it was launched according: to the majority decision. I opposed this because a massive publicity campaign without a definite dialectical relationship between propaganda and organizational work compels us to “eat more than we can digest" and destroys the revolutionary organizational pattern of the party. From that moment every publicity campaign which was launched gave rise to this situation. Although all the propaganda activity was made comparatively successful and thereby the party gained an instantaneous quantitative expansion, because the dialectical relationship between propaganda and organizational activities was not maintained, we had neither the ability nor a programme to convert the quantitative growth into positive qualitative (revolutionary) transformation of the party. The educational work which to an extent was embarked upon to bring about a qualitative growth eventually became completely destroyed. I am not in agreement with either that educational programme or the method of organization of the party. As a result of the failure to engage in educational activities, with the rapid quantitative growth of the party, the party core disintegrated and threatened to bring about the destruction of the party. This then was the qualitative change that actually took place. It is my belief that throughout the past period this was a cancerous growth within the party which could not be cured.
Moreover, even today there are no such educational or organizational programmes; and in a party such as ours, this will not take place in the future.
Due to the exhibitionist tendencies that we portrayed during our propaganda work (eg. May Day celebrations and election rallies), with the denigration of the party as a whole, parallel personal degradations were brought about within the party. Further, as a result of these exhibitionist tendencies the enemy over assessed our strength. When sections brought our attention to this aspect, isn’t it true that we rejected these ideas with complete disregard by pointing out that if we do not do so this may hinder our progress.
Our tendency to expand the party in quantitative terms gradually intensified and ultimately it culminated with the sense-less target and aim to build electoral organizations. By filling forms everywhere and enlisting people to the election organisations, and publicizing these numbers on the public platform, haven’t we fallen to the misfortune of exposing the emptiness of our own propaganda! It is correct to say that throughout the past period we put all our energy into election work. Regardless of how much we discussed various sections, work, lines of action, work that needed to be done through the artistic media, and the need to protect human rights; in the final analysis all this ended up being reduced to talk. It is more correct to state that although we portrayed ourselves as a revolutionary party we were left with only a series of "thrilling" (Exhibitionist) activities.
A task that a revolutionary party should have got involved in but which we did not endeavour to fulfill, was to get ourselves mediated in various important fields of the State machinery and to infiltrate other political organisations. We failed to formulate a programme whereby our own people are trained as lawyers to defend the comrades of the party and mass organizations against whom various repressive acts are launched. A large number of our own intellectuals who left the universities did not get involved in our work. We did not have programme whereby intellectuals could be propel1ed to work as strong party activists. Instead, we were always interested, during University Student Council elections, by propaganda means, in somehow or other getting the Socialist Students’ Union elected for the posts of the council.
Although the working class has been identified as the vanguard of the revolution, in our activities we always did and continue to lay strong emphasis on organizing sections consisting of students and unemployed youth at the provincial level. Indeed, they must also be organised. However, I am aware that both national and international history clearly reveal that only the working class, in its struggle to achieve State power, will remain intransigent to the repressive measures of the capitalist class. Although it is true that the students and youth play a powerful role in this revolutionary process, in the face of mounting repression, the role they can play relative to the working class is extremely limited. They are the first to quit the party in the face of repression. I presume you recall therefore that from the onset I emphasized that the major effort of the party should have been diverted to organize the working class and to develop its militancy. Yet I never saw this task being implemented within the party.
I was also associated with the collective decision taken by the party to establish trade unions. Yet I am reminded that here we have failed to achieve even what we had successfully achieved prior to 1971. Completely ceasing to work inside the reactionary trade unions in a revolutionary way we instead got completely engrossed in trade union politics ourselves. Except for noting Socialist Workers’ Unions (party cells consisting of workers) being dissolved within existing trade unions I rarely saw new Socialist Workers’ Unions being established within them. We were unable to see trade union activities which were politically different (except for the degree of dedication and sacrifice) from the trade union activities of the Old Left.
The leadership crisis which existed before 1971 continued after 1977. Although the lack of intellectuals in the party leadership could not be artificially suppressed, the weaknesses in our method of using intellectuals to work for the party should not be underestimated. Moreover, instead of keeping their personal problems to themse1ves, it was often the case that those who left the party leadership used their personal antagonisms against the party by making political capital out of it. In 1971 the extent to which certain individuals broke the confidence and trust placed in them by the party prior to 1971 needs no repetition. However, after 1971 when the party was being rebuilt could we honestly say that we saw anything different? Except to the Madarasinghe group, it is not wrong to say that everyone else that left the party leadership left mainly because their personal behaviour had created problems for the party. When considering the way people like Vas Tillekeratne broke the confidence the party had placed in them, one could always look at their personal history and satisfy oneself. However, we cannot even begin to explain the plight that befell some of our other comrades. What can one say on the present situation where the party is in a crisis over the lack of suitable people to hold the responsibilities of the Politburo, while these people on whom the party had placed its great trust are leaving. I believe that in many cases this harmful situation has originated due to the cliques within the party leadership.
Even if the party did not have a proper underground organization, if the above fate is the one that will befall those who were responsible in building such a structure, how could we have confidence in the party? This is not a problem that sprung up yesterday or today. A strong factor in this is that the desirable characteristics and features in the leadership of a revolutionary party have left our leadership. Our party is burdened with an insolvable leadership crisis. I cannot think of anything that will help to overcome this situation.
While the lack of a definite dialectical relationship between the party’s propaganda and organizational aspects is the root cause of the degenerative process that has been set in motion, due to the way we have gone about building our party’s organizational structure we have found it very hard for ourselves to stand up to the repression that has been meted out by the capitalist class. Our organizational work is based on the conducting of five classes and education camps. With such a programme we cannot expect to build a growing revolutionary organization. I see the experiences of our political activities in 1971 and 1977 clearly dictating the need for a completely different work prgramme if we are to genuinely grow as a revolutionary organization.
The above factors have distanced me from the party’s ideological stance. However pure the theory may be, if it does not have practical applicability it thus becomes sterile. Although we have theoretically rejected an organizational structure based on the concepts of protracted struggle, base camps, etc. saying that it does not suit this country's specific social, economic and geographical conditions, the northern militant organisations have proved beyond any doubt the practicality of the concept of protracted struggle and small-scale battles. Within the Indian context, the use of base camps in the country has as we have seen today become a practical reality.
On the national question I cannot see a difference between what we are advocating and what a genuine parliamentary party might advocate. What we are -advocating is two-faced. While recognizing the right of nations to self-determination as being a Leninist principle, to have at the same time a different principle for the destiny of the Tamil people within a JVP government could only be two-faced. Every time the economic crisis intensifies the capitalist class tries to divert peoples’ attention towards the national question. Hence, regardless of how much the economy may deteriorate, the country's specific social and historical conditions have brought the national question to the forefront as one of the primary conditions for the survival of capitalism. But the national question has in turn created an irreversible crisis for capitalism. Under capitalism, this crisis can only worsen. Hence the main task of a revolutionary party is to enquire into ways to incorporate the national question into Sri Lanka's socia1ist revolution and to act accordingly.
By being servile to either Sinhala or Tamil racism this cannot be fulfilled. Even if certain militant Tamil organizations may have originally engaged in terrorist activities, if they are now prepared to follow a progressive path, how can it not be the duty of a revolutionary organization to have a certain amount of links with these organizations and try and guide them on a correct path. What advantage can be gained for Sri Lanka’s socialist revolution by saying we will be subjected to State repression and therefore should not have such links. I feel that we can only expect to rally the Tamil people around the banner of Sri Lanka’s revolution if and only if we equate their problems with ours and agitate forcefully to solve them, and not by separating ourselves from their problems. The stance I take regarding these questions have been clarified to you before. As we have travelled further along our separate paths since then, I will not dwell on this any further.
Since our educational programme does not entertain the possibility of tactical alliances with anti-UNP capitalist parties and the Old Left, whenever the need for such an alliance has arisen opposition to this has sprung from within our party, and the leadership fear that this may create divisions has resulted us being forced to abandon such efforts. The fact that every singe time we have tried to engage in discussions on a tactical alliance with other parties we have ended up being separated from the masses and forced to work on our own, is the result of this opposition from our party comrades. We have not been able to explain to our members the necessity that may arise for having such an alliance when we are all faced with a common set of problems. Due to these factors we have only their support and solidarity when our party has been faced with repression. As a result, the leadership of other organizations have been able to build up in their membership a certain amount of distrust and wariness towards us. Due to this inherent immaturity in our party I feel we have taken on a certain sectarian form.
I am also not in agreement with the organizational methods used by the party to solve certain issues which have resulted from problems within the party. Whenever an individual or organization within the party may have problems, the fact that the party has acted in a bureaucratic manner in solving these problems has clearly registered in my mind. In the party's Politburo and Central Committee I have clarified my ideas regarding this. You may recollect the severe disagreements which developed 'between us while we were attempting to solve these problems.
Although at present the economy has been superficially dressed up to create a favourable image, it will soon not be possible to conceal the growing economic crisis. While the country’s objective conditions for a revolutionary situation are ripening, a corresponding development in the country’s revolutionary subjective conditions is not to be seen. What we have instead is the lack of a revolutionary party and leadership. Both the traditional as well as the New Left have been seriously weakened. With the further suppression of the revolutionary movement the capitalist class continues to move towards an autocratic dictatorship. It can be said that the situation provides a fertile ground for a capitalist military dictatorship. In such a situation one can see signs of a grave threat to the people of this country and to the Left movement. In such situation the policies followed by the JVP can honestly give us no joy but are instead causing us a great deal of sorrow. I honestly believe that the responsibility for today’s situation has to be shared first, by the capitalist class and their lackeys and second, by the JVP. This situation cannot be instantaneously changed. The socialist revolution can only move forward if and only if it confronts the objective and concrete conditions which have originated from, and have been created by the national question. Within such a situation I conclude that the usefulness of the exiting form and organizational structure of the JVP which was meant to fulfill its historical and political role has come to an end.
In 1971 when other comrades and I were in prison and facing upto the task of rebuilding the party, my intention was to extricate myself from the leadership responsibilities once the party was rebuilt. Although I felt differently once we were out and working, the steps taken in mid-1982 by the party to solve the problems created by Vas and Maureen, the steps taken to solve the problems posed by our comrades and internal organizations left me disheartened. Although the amount of work I did diminished, I tried to do as much as possible. The situation that arose after the Presidential Election necessitated that we work to rebuild the party. However, it cannot be said that this made the situation any better; and in fact, the situation continued to deteriorate. While I was being held by the CID I made up my mind to work during the crisis period with the aim of upholding the righteousness of the politics pursued by the party and me, and to work towards bringing the party back to a position of legality, after which I was going to resign from the party leadership.
I have no personal animosity towards any comrades within the party. What I have expressed here is based on my political disagreements with the party. At this moment in time I cannot say that there is an organization more progressive than the JVP. I will therefore not work against the JVP. I hope to work as an independent Marxist. In future I intend to assist those individuals and organizations that I feel should be helped and to work in whatever capacity, while maintaining my independence, towards the advance of Sri Lanka’s revolutionary politics, and to be aware of the country's future political developments.
I leave all of you with whom I have been in association with to a lesser or to a great extent, with fraternity.
Victory to the movement of the oppressed people of Sri Lanka!
Victory to the Socialist Revolution of Sri Lanka!
Yours Comradely,
Lionel Bopage
29 February 1984
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