Political violence in Sri Lanka
Lionel Bopage
1 February 2009
1. Introduction
The last six decades have witnessed many violent conflicts[1] across the world; only a few of which have been successfully resolved[2]. The protracted conflict in Sri Lanka continues to cause death, destruction and devastation, particularly to those living in the north and the east.
Recent infantile and chauvinist statements of the country’s elite express their belief that the current phase of political violence is mainly due to the LTTE’s terrorist activities and that once the LTTE is defeated militarily so will the national question (National Post 2008). History tells a different story. Unless the root causes of the conflict are genuinely addressed, political violence will continue to grow.
The island’s post-1948 political leadership did not come into being as a result of a coherent anti-colonial struggle that unified its people. The neo-colonial establishment not only carried forward the policies and practices of the exclusively colonial, mono-cultural and unitary administration, which were not only incongruent with the culturally and linguistically diverse nature of its inhabitants, but also their socio-economic, political and cultural expectations.
The post-colonial Sri Lankan state never considered it significant to protect the dignity and security of marginalised and disadvantaged social groups. Domestic issues were viewed and dealt with in a mindset of a conflict paradigm[3]. Peaceful demands for social equity, justice, security and dignity were continuously disregarded and/or violently suppressed. The indignity and insecurity caused by such attacks on the physical and psychological integrity of individuals and communities thus motivated them to take up arms.
This paper looks at aspects of political violence in Sri Lanka such as its complexity, the radicalisation of youth, responses of the state and the left, current developments, and the need to view and deal with it on an interactionist paradigm, if an end to this destructive conflict is genuinely sought.
2. Complexity of the conflict
The roots of political violence in Sri Lanka can be traced back to its colonial days and reflect many national and global dimensions. The island is strategically located in the South Asian region in a geo-political, mercantile, and militaristic sense. Trans-national capital is competitively seeking investments, cheap labour, and natural resources to maximise their profits in this region. Therefore, political violence occurring in Sri Lanka (Alexander 2007) cannot be viewed in isolation. However, this paper is not an in depth study of the global aspects of the conflict. Yet, this needs to be kept in mind when reading this paper.
2.1. Simplification and manipulation of the conflict
Conventional simplifications of political violence in Sri Lanka to class, economic, cultural, ethnic, casteist, or military aspects seem inaccurate, since class boundaries are mixed up with other social caveats. Such simplifications prevent recognition and understanding of the internecine power struggles and manipulations that keep certain groups in control. Some intervene to block any form of power sharing, while others reject any devolution in the hope of achieving separation.
The underlying causes for political violence in Sri Lanka has simply been interpreted and presented as class / ethnicity based, or a terrorist problem, and even extending such analyses along casteist, religious, nationalist, and cultural lines. The youth insurrection in 1971 is labelled as Sinhala, Buddhist, low caste, low class, anti-Tamil, anti-Indian, or terrorist, while the ongoing Tamil youth insurrection is labelled Tamil, Hindu (or Christian), low caste, low-class, anti-Sinhala, anti-Indian, or terrorist.
Political violence cannot be properly understood without recognizing the complex internecine establishment politics in Sri Lanka. When new social groups vied for access to state power, the establishment used repressive and violent force against them. Pro-establishment forces closed ranks against the ‘common enemy’ by unifying and coordinating their efforts, at times, across the whole political spectrum. Behind the political violence of the state one could witness strategies for the further plundering of the island’s resources. Behind the political clichés of terrorism and counter-terrorism was the continuous march towards authoritarianism, in which people’s hopes, aspirations, human rights and civil liberties were increasingly dashed. Existing social divisions such as nationality, language, religion, caste are manipulated to establish and maintain the political power of the ruling elite.
2.2. Interpretation of history
Current tensions between the Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim communities can be traced back to the fact that Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim communities have their own positivist interpretations of their historical roots. A sizable majority of Sinhalese believe their race is of Aryan stock dating back to the fifth century BC. The Tamils including Malaiyaha Tamils[4], are of Dravidian origin. Some of the Tamils[5] claim that they were part of the island’s original inhabitants, a claim strongly disputed by the Sinhalese. Tamil incursions from South India trace back to the first century A.D., and a Tamil kingdom existed in the North commencing from the thirteenth century[6]. The identity of Malaiyaha Tamils is shaped by their social, economic, political and cultural lives centred primarily on plantations.
Some try to interpret the current violence as inevitably deriving from the ancient primordial ethnic hatreds of the ‘Mahawamsa’ nature. The reality, however, was that the wars between Sinhalese and Tamil kings were launched mainly for expanding their feudal territories. Another interpretation points to the privileged positions provided to Tamils under colonial and neo-colonial administrations - that political violence was the eventual outcome of the Tamils losing those privileged positions. Nevertheless, these are often excuses used to blunt further analysis of majoritarian power politics. Besides, such approaches unashamedly justify and unconditionally support a policy of subjugation of opposing groups as adopted by the current ruling elite.
2.3. Basis of analysis
Political violence is not unique to Sri Lanka. The causes of political violence have been broadly categorised as caused by national fragmentation, inequitable development, cultural clashes and liberation movements (Steinbach 1980). These causes do not exist in isolation, but interact simultaneously leading to political violence. It is significant to note that in the post-1948 Sri Lanka, any major organised political violence was absent until 1956. Ethnic political violence that commenced in 1956 was mainly due to the machinations of modern ‘democratic’ electoral politics, deliberately conceived and orchestrated as a means of capturing and keeping power in the hands of the bourgeoisie.
Post-colonial socio-economic and political developments brought about new social forces, but their expectations remained unfulfilled. Consequently, these forces turned to revolutionary practices against the elite's stronghold on the levers of political patronage and economics. In the south these revolutionary practices materialised in the form of class mobilisations. The attempts in the north and east, however, took the form of nationalist aspirations. These origins reflect the dual character of the youth movements that later came into being.
The post-1948 political establishment concentrated mainly on short term tactical electoral gains by engaging in nepotism, family bandyism and class collaboration. Political leaderships of all ethnicities in Sri Lanka have opportunistically used ethnicity as a bandwagon to establish, preserve and enhance their political, economic and social power, or to distract the people from the domestic policy and program failures of the establishment. Nevertheless, many analysts portray ethnicity as the central theme of the current conflict[7]. Though ethnicity is used as a label in the current conflict; politics based on economic manipulations is the root cause. Ethnic diversity has always existed in the Sri Lankan society and will continue to do so. Good governance, therefore, means having a society free from violence and based on equity, participative democracy and pluralism.
3. Anti- capitalist radicalisation and Political Violence
Lack of appropriate political and economic development, equitable distribution of economic benefits, and lack of equitable opportunities provided the essential ingredients for the radicalisation of youth in Sri Lanka. Political violence in the island can be traced back to the feudal age, as manifested in regular invasions by South Indian rulers, wars to expand feudal territories, and assassinations to transfer royal power, and to the colonial era, as manifested in the aggression and terror committed by colonialists against indigenous inhabitants.
When the British took control of the whole island in 1815, they introduced capitalist mode of production based on exports and imports. Capitalism required capital accumulation, wage labour, huge tracts of land and infrastructure, concentration of power in the hands of a few, and a base for administrative assistance from the locals (Samaranayake 2008). The Colebrook-Cameron reforms of 1832 abolished the system of service tenure, established a unitary administration for the whole country and introduced English as the medium of instruction.
By the late 19th century, a plantation economy was firmly rooted as the backbone of the capitalist economy. Land was found by evicting peasants from their land. Yet, their attempts to convert peasants into wage labour did not succeed. Traditional rural life of peasants was neglected. Felling natural forests brought with it serious problems of soil erosion, floods, droughts and other epidemics. By the 1880s, this led to the emergence of a dual agricultural economy: ‘a highly developed, organized, foreign-owned, capitalistic plantation economy producing for export in the central highlands’, and ‘a tradition-bound, primitive, self sufficing, subsistence peasant economy producing for domestic consumption in the remainder of the wet and dry zone areas of the country’ (Ponnambalam 1981). This uneven capitalist development had long-lasting effects on rural peasants, who became increasingly impoverished. The eviction of the peasantry from their lands and the creation of the plantation economy generated issues of landlessness, land fragmentation, and lack of water for irrigation due to wanton ruining of ancient irrigation systems.
The colonial rulers, however, made privileges available to the English-educated locals, while treating the rest as slave labour, thus providing a fertile breeding ground for local nationalisms. The growing influence of the left in the south and the Jaffna Youth Congress (JYC)[8] in the north delayed the emergence of these radicalisations along ethnic lines but temporarily. The above represented the origins of the dual anti-capitalist radicalisations of the youth in Sri Lanka along class and nationalist lines.
3.1. Colonial responses
Pre-1948 Sri Lanka did not have an industrial sector except for what was required to maintain a plantation economy. This policy remained in place till 1959. This situation changed when the socialist camp led by the Soviet Union helped establish several major industries in Sri Lanka. The infrastructure that was developed to maintain the plantation economy placed the local peasantry in double jeopardy as this infrastructure was built by wantonly ruining the ancient irrigation systems, so essential to maintain their crops.
In a predominantly agricultural economy, approximately half of the gainfully employed population were non-agricultural (Samaranayake 2008). Free education was introduced in 1945, and the medium of instruction was changed to local languages, which created an expansion of higher educational opportunities for rural youth. This was welcomed by them as a means to alleviate their increasing unemployment, as the availability of land and water for agriculture became more acute.
The state’s reaction to any socio-economic demand was often to curtail freedom, weaken political institutions, and move towards authoritarianism. So, class mobilisation in the south became totally based on opposition to social exclusion and economic deprivation. By 1948, the lack of land and water for agriculture had become the main issues confronting the rural Sinhala youth. The free importation of rice from overseas also undermined the commercial viability of food crop production based on insecure land tenure[9].
The national question, which is the basis for the political violence by Tamils, cannot be explained just as an ethnic conflict between the majority Sinhala community and the Tamil community (de Silva 1986). Post 1948 socio-economic and political changes, which were based on policies and practices implemented to alleviate the problems of the majority and to distract their attention, had an adverse impact on the Tamil people.
3.2. Role played by India
Indian involvement in Sri Lanka has been significant, particularly, when political violence due to internal conflicts in Sri Lanka occurred, indicating its strategic economic and political interests and influence in the region. Its involvement bears all the hallmarks of super power manipulations at the time and its domestic political pressures.
During the JVP led political violence in 1971, India provided moral, financial and military support to the Sri Lankan state. It had even been prepared to invade Sri Lanka, if the JVP took power (Samaranayake 2008). India also did not obstruct financial, material and military support flowing from all the political power blocs to the Sri Lankan state[10]. However, India’s role in the case of Tamil political violence was different. It did not wish any active involvement by external players in South Asia.
Fuelled by its concerns over the balance of power in the region and the pro-US and anti-Indian stand of the then government, India assisted the Tamil militants by providing them with training in the early 1980s. Later, India played a role of mediator in the case of Tamil youth insurrection through the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and sending Indian Peace Keeping Forces to Sri Lanka. This intervention led to a new wave of political violence in the North by Tamil militants and in the South by the JVP.
3.3. Class based politics and Identity politics
Both the JVP and the LTTE have verbally acknowledged their commitment to socialism. However, they are politically driven by their allegiances to ethnicity, not class. They can be classified as movements based on rural youth that are driven by bourgeois nationalist ideology, the JVP representing the Sinhalese side of the coin and the LTTE the Tamil side.
The JVP is supportive of forming a partnership with the capitalist state and disregards the just and fair demands of the Tamil people. It is supportive of the military, the capitalist state and its bureaucracy, and the religious hierarchy. The JVP’s original aim in the seventies was to overthrow the Sri Lankan state through an armed insurrection. However, this stance appears to have changed since the 1990s. Their current aim is to establish government under a capitalist setup.
The LTTE disregarding the necessity to unite and work with the Sinhala and Muslim people,, intended forming a partnership with the capitalist state in governing the north east. The LTTE’s alleged aim in the past was to force out the occupational forces of the ‘Sinhala’ state from their traditional homeland through a protracted armed struggle, not the overthrowing of the Sri Lankan state.
In the 1990s the LTTE had become a conventional armed force with the capability to challenge the forces of the state, and its fighting cadres formed into the many apparatus of a state. It was able to acquire state of the art equipment, technology and training, introduced a system of taxation and established a wide Diaspora network to support its many activities and fronts. The LTTE had the capability to assemble large units and launch surprise attacks to overrun highly fortified military facilities of the state in the north and east. In the south, it was able to operate deep penetration units, suicide attacks and bombings to assassinate political and military leaders. The LTTE vied to become the sole representative of the Tamil people by physically eliminating all its political rivals.
3.4. Response of the state and counter-responses
Political violence has posed a serious challenge to the existing socio-economic order and the political institutions of the country. Therefore, successive governments have more often ruled the country under state of emergency. The state has used strategies of brutal counter-violence to neutralise and discredit its opponents. It has also used state privileges and material incentives to get groups and factions of its opponents to side with the state. Generally, the state has made use of supremacist or chauvinist ideologies to divide and distract the people.
Successive governments have carried out colonisation schemes on a mass scale. Tamil groups objected to these schemes, as large numbers of Sinhalese are settled in what they consider as their traditional Tamil areas. The state maintains that Sri Lanka is a single country, its citizens may freely move into any area as they wish, and relocating some people to more productive areas is necessary. The Tamil groups respond by stating that they are not opposed to individual migration but only to large scale government colonization schemes aimed at changing the ethnic composition of an area.
Following the communal riots of July 1983, the government rushed through legislation to exclude from the parliament, any party that refused to swear allegiance to the unitary state. This effectively disenfranchised Tamils in the north east and significantly weakened and isolated the democratic Tamil opposition. This provided the Tamil militant movement with fertile ground for new recruitment. In the late 1980s the LTTE emerged as the dominant Tamil militant group.
The LTTE is characterised as an armed group led by one person, enjoying broad support from local and Diaspora Tamil communities (Lewer and Williams 2002). It maintains a culture of martyrdom, and has consistently stood for the right to self-determination, while running a parallel government. It has consistently demanded that the government offer an alternative to Tamil Eelam based on Thimpu Principles[11]. Successive wars and policies launched against the LTTE in the past for weakening, or isolating them had always boomeranged by further strengthening it.[12] However, in the current phase of the war, the state security forces have significantly weakened the LTTE.
From the hartal of 1953 to the general strike in 1981, through the ‘satyagraha’ campaigns in 1956, the general political work in the seventies, protest action against the 1972 Constitution and election violence since the eighties, repression has been the state response to any demand for justice and equality[13].
4. Radicalisation of Youth
Lack of appropriate political and economic development, equitable distribution of economic benefits, and equitable opportunities provided the essential ingredients for young peoples' radicalisation. The universal franchise and the lowering of the voting age allowed young people to take part in active electoral politics. Free education was introduced in 1945, and the medium of instruction was changed to local languages, which created an expansion of higher educational opportunities. This was seen as a welcome relief to the rural youth, and a palliative to their high and increasing unemployment.
Lack of opportunities to actively take part in social, economic and political life led to extremely tense situations, which in turn led to discontent amongst the youth, who started questioning the existing socio, political and ideological status quo and its value systems. This objectivity led them to subjectively perceive the necessity for revolutionary change. The failure of the ruling elite to introduce social, economic and political change and make them inclusive alienated the majority of young people. All governments regardless of their political hue failed to see the underlying socio-political, economic and psychological causes of these revolts. The more repressive the state apparatus became the more the youth rebelled.
Since 1948 Sri Lanka has witnessed three major insurrections involving political violence mainly by its youth. Many socio-economic and political conditions that underpinned and contributed to these insurrections reflected the diverse, but significant and unfulfilled aspirations of the younger generations of Sri Lanka. Since the 1970s, younger generations of Sinhalese and Tamils from similar socio-economic backgrounds have revolted against the erosion of their economic, political and cultural rights.
This political violence represented the anti-establishment sentiments of the country’s younger generations. The JVP militancy predominantly represented the aspirations of the rural young lower-middle class Sinhala Buddhist constituency (Samaranayake 2008). The Tamil militancy represented the aspirations of the rural young lower-middle class Tamil constituency from Hindu and Christian religious backgrounds.
Growth of the JVP and the LTTE underscored the role played by these socio-economic, political and cultural factors. As political violence became manifested in the north and east, the responses of the state and the Tamil militants caused an extension of this radicalisation and alienation within and among the Tamil, Muslim and Sinhala communities in Sri Lanka. Since July 1983 riots, the Tamil militants, in particular the LTTE, came to represent most Tamils, with the exception of the Malaiyaha Tamils and the Muslims.
Both the JVP and the LTTE have been the products of the failures of economic and political development in Sri Lanka (Samaranayake 2008). The state repressed both the JVP and the LTTE using brutal force. Both fought back separately and uncompromisingly. Later, the JVP and the LTTE again separately, but simultaneously fought against the establishment and the presence of Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) in the island. The ideologies of both the JVP and the LTTE are not based on current realities but rather on the commitment to their own brands of nationalism.
Malaiyaha youth, who had left plantations due to communal violence in the South and settled down in the LTTE-controlled areas, are at the receiving end of the parties to the conflict. The coming decades will be critical for Malaiyaha Tamils because without significant government intervention, ‘the growing number of over-educated and under-employed Malaiyaha Tamil youths may turn to militant protests and violence, as the JVP and LTTE did before them’ (Bass 2001).
Despite their diverse ethnic origins, Islam unites the Muslims in Sri Lanka. Some of the Tamil leaders branded Muslims as ‘Tamils by ethnic origin’, which apparently affected the relations between them (Ali 2001). Nevertheless, in the eighties some of the Muslim youth joined hands with Tamil militants. As Muslims opposed the merger of the North and East under the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord, significant differences surfaced between Tamil militants and Muslims (Guruge 2006). Later on as the Tamil political violence also turned against the Muslims, some of the Muslim groups allegedly sided with the government. This situation led to massacres and eviction of Muslims by the LTTE (Ameerdeen 2006).[14]
During the time of the Ceasefire Agreement between the Government and the LTTE in 2002, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress. The LTTE during the peace talks apologised for its acts against the Muslims, recognised that the Muslims are a separate community with their own identity, and accepted their right to represent their interests at any future negotiations (The Sunday Times 2002). Since then, this agreement also collapsed. Muslims now are seeking constitutional safeguards and power sharing to protect their interests. This situation has radicalised the Muslim youth who also seems to have taken to political violence.
The militant youth movements expressed their dissatisfaction with the state and their desire for change through political violence. Both the JVP and the LTTE adhered to a mixed ideology of socialism and nationalism. The state was their common enemy; however, succumbing to their nationalistic politics of the glories of their respective feudal past, they saw each other as enemies; not allies.
4.1. Radicalisation in the south
Origins of the JVP can be traced back to the mid sixties. The constituents of the LSSP-CP-MEP United Left Front (ULF) joined the bourgeois political parties in 1964. The new ‘movement’, JVP, came forward to fill the vacuum left by the ULF. The JVP worked semi-clandestinely by publishing newspapers, conducting political classes and debates, contesting student council elections, and leading student strikes to shore up its support base. The movement launched an island wide publicity campaign and extended its support to the SLFP-LSSP-CP United Front (UF) coalition at the parliamentary elections of 1970.
The JVP represents a mixture of Sinhala nationalism and Marxist ideology. Its nationalistic element rested on the historic glory of the past Sinhala Kingdoms. It wants to achieve a unitary state by defending the ‘motherland’, where Sinhala Buddhist cultural identity could flourish and western cultural decadence could be negated. Yet, their idea of socialism has been subsumed by its commitment to safeguard the unitary state, which is ironically a colonial construct.
The JVP was able to successfully mobilize the southern youth, but committed strategic and tactical errors. It was brutally suppressed twice, but was able to regroup and rejuvenate changing its focus from class to nationalism. The first JVP insurrection in 1971 occurred predominantly in the South, because the economic and social changes they expected from the UF government they helped to elect in 1970 were not forthcoming. The political aim of the JVP was to violently replace the establishment with a fairer one. Whatever the limitations of the insurrection the reasons for the conflict points to major flaws in democratic institutions.
In the seventies, the JVP took up the policy of the right to self determination of Tamil people (Bopage 1977) and recognised Sinhala, Tamil and English as the national languages of the island (JVP 1978). It also pledged “true egalitarianism and autonomous rule” for Tamils and Muslims. However, it discarded these policies just prior to the Black July riots of 1983. Their campaign in the late 1980s against the Indo Lanka Accord led to the assassination of dozens of workers and political opponents for refusing to take part in ‘patriotic’ protests and strikes. The JVP had now degenerated into a Sinhala nationalist party that continues to vehemently oppose any devolution of power.
4.2. Radicalisation in the north
Since 1948, the Tamils in the island have been systematically denied their legitimate rights, mainly relating to equal opportunities in areas of language, education and employment.[15] Disenfranchisement of Malaiyaha Tamils and the Sinhala only language policy led Tamil political parties to demand a federal framework.
The abrogation of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam pact of 1958 and the Dudley-Chelvanayagam Pact of 1968 created a lot of anger, frustration and disillusionment among Tamils that eventually led to the birth of separatist militant movements. The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) adopted the Vaddukoddai Resolution in 1976, demanding Tamil Eelam, which had a massive impact on the political landscape of the island (Nesiah 2001).
The politics of the Tamil youth groups in the 1980s were a mixture of Tamil nationalism and Marxist ideology. The nationalistic element rested on the historic glories of the Tamil Kingdom. They wanted to achieve a separate state in their ‘traditional homeland’, where Tamil cultural identity could flourish and western cultural decadence could be negated. Differences between diverse Tamil political groups were based on different interpretations of Marxism-Leninism[16], but the idea of achieving a separate state subsumed their commitment to socialism.
The post-1948 government policies on language, colonisation, university admission, and employment led to discontent of the Tamil youth. The state used violence to suppress peaceful protests by the Tamil movements. Their parliamentary representatives could not achieve any positive outcomes for their constituents. Thus Tamil youth demanded autonomy, which later on became one of secession. This situation led to cycles of political violence and counter violence. The LTTE received material, financial and moral support from the Tamil Diaspora. The LTTE has continued to carry out its violent campaign, though currently it seems to be on the defensive.
Today the continuation of the conflict has created in the North East of Sri Lanka, the worst humanitarian disaster only second to the disaster in Darfur in Sudan.
5. Opportunism of the left
The ruling elites played the ethnic card to prop up their political fortunes. By turning the class struggle into one of ethnic hatred, they distracted the people from the economic basis of their exploitation. The left failed to counter this blatant chauvinism. In their attempts to achieve parliamentary power they eventually bought into the opportunistic ethnic politics. This led to the eventual debasement of the traditional left, the JVP and the Tamil left groups.
The traditional left stood for the parity of languages, democracy and equality during the fifties and stood by the Tamils during anti-Tamil riots in the south. They also supported a federal setup. However, the turning point came in the 1960s, when the left entered into coalition politics with the SLFP, opportunistically shifting its position on issues that were relevant to the youth and ethnic minorities.
In the late 1960s, the UF coalition opposed decentralisation of power to the regions. In 1970 the coalition government introduced a policy of standardisation with a district quota system which steeply reduced the proportion of Tamil students (as a percentage of total admissions)[17] accepted for science, engineering and medical faculties (de Silva 1978). Dr Colvin R de Silva, who was a leading member of the LSSP, was the architect of the 1972 constitution that abolished the protections given to minorities under section 29 of the Soulbury Constitution, provided Buddhism the ‘foremost place’, and institutionalised preferential treatment to Sinhala Buddhists in educational and economic opportunities.
Seeing the new left as its grave-digger, the old left decided to wipe out the JVP at the earliest opportunity. Having failed to slander the JVP, it launched a covert terror campaign against it. They used the state apparatus and vigilante groups to repress the JVP. The JVP violently fought back against this brutal repression.
In addition, the coalition government did not seek to fulfil the unrealized political aspirations of the Tamil people despite their demand for equal rights. This provided the basis for alienation between the Sinhala and Tamil people and the systematic harassment of Tamil youth in the form of arbitrary arrests, and detention without trial. As a result, the Tamil youth movement gathered momentum introducing new nationalist alternative solutions to the national question which led to the political violence that can be witnessed even today.
The left and the working class movement need to take a firm and unambiguous stand and state that any proposed solution to the national question should guarantee democratic rights of all the citizens of the island, irrespective of their socio-economic and cultural background.
6. Current Situation
Sri Lanka has a low per capita income but a high level of literacy, low infant mortality and relatively high life expectancy. War, unfair economic policies, poverty and unemployment have seriously dented these indices. The cost of living index and the rate of inflation have been on the rise. The strength of the JVP has dwindled as a result of its collaborative politics and the divisions that occurred as a result. The state security forces have almost captured all the territory previously under the control of the LTTE. This has been a significant military victory to the state and a significant military setback to the LTTE. It is also a major political blow to its goal of establishing a separate state.
6.1. Factors contributing to political violence
In Sri Lanka the emergence of political violence was underpinned by the articulation and assertion of nationalistic and economic demands for justice by the youth. These demands and the resultant political violence were of a dual character, one nationalistic and the other class. One aimed at the capture of state power and the other at autonomy from the existing state. The economic growth and its unequal distribution in the post-1948 era did not placate these demands; and did not break down the barriers of ethnicity and class. Their violence was a cry for economic and cultural parity by the younger generations. The response of the state based on ‘divide and rule' policies slayed any hopes of fulfilling their aspirations.
Collective political violence is embedded as a characteristic of the class society in Sri Lanka and used by the state, and groups oppressed by the state as a norm. State and non-state actors have used political violence including terror to target civilian populations, communities, their leaders and professionals. Regimes have often authorised killer ‘assassination specialists’[18] to silence their opponents, persistently interweaving it with their normal political practices. Since mid fifties, these ‘killer squads’ have operated in the shadows committing disappearances[19] and the torture of political enemies of state. This sort of violent behaviour on the part of states, both domestic and international, has generated other forms of political violence including terror in countries like Sri Lanka.
6.2. Uneven distribution of wealth
Dynamics of uneven development created backwardness in the rural areas of Sri Lanka. Localities where opportunities for secondary and higher education expanded due to welfare measures of the state ironically brought out a lower and upper middle class generation of aspirational youth, who were able to articulate their demands. However, the incapacity of the state to fulfil these aspirations brought about cycles of political violence. Uneven development engenders violence, and in turn violence disrupts development. To get out of this vicious cycle it is necessary to develop self-regulatory mechanisms to ensure the just and equitable treatment of people irrespective of their cultural background.
6.3. Rapid militarisation
One of the priorities of the state has been spending vast sums of money on the war. The estimated defence expenditure for 2009 is Rs. 177.1 billion, an increase of about seven percent from the previous years. However, the actual expenditure may exceed the budgeted expenditure. In 2008, the budgeted expenditure was Rs. 166 billion, but when military procurements on hire purchase are taken into account the figure becomes more than Rs. 456 million a day, or more than Rs. 8,536 per person. Militarisation has created a war industry on which the country depends on. Rural villagers receive an income when their young ones join the forces or receive compensation in case of their death or ‘missing in action’. The armed forces have rapidly expanded. The increasing militarisation of society has significantly contributed to the increasing political violence and the aggravating trauma related stress in the society as a whole.
6.4. Who are responsible for instigating political violence
In 1958, 1961, 1974, 1977 and 1983 Tamils in the south were brutally attacked; some were tortured; thousands were massacred in cold blood simply because they were Tamils. The state was complicit in this process. So it is not surprising that the gun, rather than the ballot, became the tool for many Tamils in their struggle for self-determination. Violent reprisals of the LTTE have been similarly brutal and inhumane.[20] The current conflict has grown in its intensity and ruthlessness. The lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians trapped in the war torn areas are at risk today. The conduct of a war should not be an excuse to maim, kill and destroy the internally displaced people and civilians.
6.5. The state and the government
It is difficult to project future scenarios as the state or the LTTE has not succeeded in eliminating one another. As the cycle of violence turns vicious, the state uses intangible, uniformalised, extra-constitutional and extra-judicial forms of violence in their counter-violence strategies. As Major General Sarath Fonseka puts it (National Post 2008):
‘I strongly believe that this country belongs to the Sinhalese but there are minority communities and we treat them like our people. We being the majority of the country, 75 percent, we will never give in and we have the right to protect this country…We are also a strong nation... They can live in this country with us. But they must not try to, under the pretext of being a minority, demand undue things.’
Under the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) ‘stimulating racial intolerance or violence by words or actions’ are considered terrorist acts. While journalists like Mr J.S. Tissainayagam are held for writing articles criticizing the actions of the government, Sinhala chauvinists are made exempt? Is this a clear indication that the government represents the interests of only one ethnic group? Controlling the state’s own bureaucrats from contributing to anti-Tamil sentiment is essential. The Tamil people are entitled to protection of their physical security because they are also citizens of Sri Lanka. This protection cannot be taken for granted as evidenced from what has happened in the past and what is happening now.
6.6. Military solution or political solution
Erosion of civil liberties and degeneration of democratic institutions in the last four decades due to political violence have resulted in more than one hundred thousand dead, mostly civilians, and hundreds of thousands displaced, who have become refugees in their own land. There are thousands of war widows, orphans, invalids, and millions of people walking around with mental scars.
Military defeat of the LTTE will not solely resolve the country’s crisis. Successive governments have used nationalism to divide and rule the working people. The Tamil people have been at the receiving end of systematic harassment, intimidation and arbitrary arrests. Over the past two years, hundreds of people have been abducted and made to disappear. As the government has no solution to the socio-economic crisis, a military victory over the LTTE will assist the state to keep control over the working people for some more time. The country is at danger of becoming a chauvinistic police state where non-Sinhala people will have to live under the mercy and grace of the majority.
7. Conclusion
Post-colonial political violence in Sri Lanka is a manifestation of birth pangs of the transitions that are necessary in the move to a better Sri Lanka where equitable and participative politics will prevail. This violence is the result of a process of decolonisation; a result of a war of succession; a war about the refusal of those in control to share or transfer power; a war about rectifying the injustices imposed by colonialism and the post-1948 bourgeois ruling elites.
The overwhelming majority of people wish for an end to the political violence. What is needed for this is a political movement that could unite people on the basis of a democratic socialist policy platform that would reject all special privileges for any one community and discard all forms of chauvinism. Therefore, building a social-democratic opposition is necessary to exert pressure on the major parties to resolve internal conflicts through political and democratic means.
Equitable distribution of the results of economic development and participatory democracy are essential for the society to progress. While recognising specific problems people in Sri Lanka face due to the current conflict, the challenges they face due to capitalist globalisation also need to be recognised and addressed. If solutions to these problems and challenges cannot be found internally, external forces could interfere for their own benefit and interest. However, the cultural change Sri Lanka needs to go through is alien to its political traditions.
Whoever values humanity, peace, democracy, freedom and liberty needs to rise up and show that they oppose the repressive political culture in Sri Lanka. All people who value equality and equity need to exert pressure on the state to negotiate towards a meaningful and just power sharing arrangement. Power sharing will weaken the forces of national subjugation and separation. However, it can only succeed when strong leaderships exist. Also, this requires treating the other with dignity and respect in the process of negotiation. That is the only way to ensure security and dignity of all the people in Sri Lanka. Such a solution will last much longer than any military victory, which by its very nature can only be temporary.
Ensuring the aspirations of the marginalised are met, requires a paradigm shift in the attitudes and thinking of the majority to a critical, inclusive and constructivist mode towards the marginalised in the society. The marginalised in turn need to invent the characteristics of a new society that would assist in materialising their aspirations. Sinhala and Tamil expatriates that helped perpetuate this conflict could now make a positive contribution to its resolution by engaging in dialogue within their community and with other communities. The diaspora needs to become active drivers of this paradigm shift by changing their role from advocates of political violence to constructively creating this reality through their interactions with each other.
If peaceful coexistence through power sharing is not achievable, the current conflict is likely to continue. Even if the Government and the Sri Lankan Armed Forces manage to weaken, defeat or eliminate the LTTE militarily without a just political solution based on genuine and fair power sharing arrangements granting equity and equality to non-Sinhala people of the island, the secessionist tendencies and movements could re-emerge. The outcome of such a scenario would be that 'the Government was winning the war while losing peace and the future'. A way out of this possible adverse outcome is the implementation of a federal constitutional framework that strengthens democracy and good governance and provides regional autonomy to the Tamil and Muslim peoples. Such radical political reforms, in the long term, will rid peoples’ fears, mistrusts and humiliations of the other, and provide much needed space to reflect on the way forward.
As the Buddha aptly preached in the Chakkavatti Sihanada Sutra:
‘... money not being given to the poor, poverty flourished; because poverty flourished, theft flourished; because theft flourished, weaponry flourished; because weaponry flourished, murder flourished; because murder flourished, these beings' vitality decreased, as did their beauty...’ (Collins S 1998).
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Summary
Lionel Bopage attributes political violence in Sri Lanka to the use of repressive measures by Sri Lanka’s political establishment to deny access to political power to those outside the establishment. He argues that nationality, language, religion and caste have been manipulated to establish and maintain political power by the ruling elite. He goes on to argue that the left failed to counter this blatant chauvinism and instead engaged in opportunistic ethnic politics of their own to gain parliamentary power. In doing so the left has debased itself.
It is in this context that he traces the insurrection led by the radicalised Southern (Sinhalese) and Northern (Tamil) youth. He points to the significant fact that political violence was absent until 1956. He argues that political violence was the result of a deliberate attempt by the bourgeoisie to capture and keep power. He is critical of Indian involvement in the island’s affairs (particularly in the context of political violence due to internal conflicts); he is of the view that Indian involvement was driven by its strategic economic and political interests and not by humanitarian reasons. He cites examples like: India’s assistance to the Sri Lankan state to combat the 1971 JVP insurrection predominantly by Sinhalese in the south, it’s arming of the Tamil militants in the early 1980s and the deployment of its forces in the late 1980s to suppress the very group that it had armed.
He attributes the Indian intervention to the new wave of political violence in the North by the Tamil youth and in the South by the Sinhala youth. He acknowledges that the LTTE had by then become a conventional force and that successive wars launched against the LTTE instead of weakening it, had only further strengthened it. However, the recent capture of almost all the territory that was under control of the LTTE is a significant military victory to the state, a significant military setback to the LTTE, and a major political blow to its separatist goal. He concludes that if peaceful coexistence through power sharing is not achievable, the current conflict is likely to continue with the possibility of secessionist tendencies and movements re-emerging. A way out of this is the implementation of a federal constitutional framework that strengthens democracy and good governance and provides regional autonomy to the Tamil and Muslim peoples. Such radical political reforms, in the long term, will rid peoples’ fears, mistrusts and humiliations of the other, and provide much needed space to reflect on the way forward.
[1] The form of these conflicts vary from secession to re-unification, from autonomy to integration, from socialism to neo-liberalism, from economic to religious ones
[2] Marshall (2008) indicates that 24 conflicts are currently ongoing; four may end soon; ten are at high risk of returning to political violence.
[3] What is seen in a conflict and how it is understood depend on the reference model or framework (paradigm) being used. Viewing conflicts in social behaviour through a positivist paradigmatic model (conflict paradigm) will be different to viewing it using a constructivist paradigmatic model (interactionist paradigm). One model will assist in understanding what policies and activities have assisted to bring conflicts to a close, while other policies and activities have made some conflicts protracted.
[4] The so-called Indian or Estate Tamils, workers of Indian origin speaking Tamil who were brought by the British to work in their plantations in 1840s.
[5] The so-called Jaffna or Ceylon Tamils
[6] According to Professor K M de Silva, beginning in the thirteenth century and until the advent of the Portuguese, a Jaffna kingdom with shifting boundaries existed in the Northern Province
[7] Ethnic conflict may occur between aggregations of people that share a collective view of themselves as being distinctively different from other aggregations of people because of their shared inherent characteristics such as their race, religion, language, cultural heritage, clan, or tribal affiliation.
[8] JYC was a dominant political force in the North in 1920s and 1930s and appreciated the harmonious and tolerant relations that existed at the time between Sinhalese and Tamils, Moors and Burghers (Nesiah 1945)
[9] A system of agricultural production where the landowner allows the tenant to use the land for a share of the crop produced.
[10] Assistance was obtained from the U.S. and Chinese camps by indicating that the JVP was KGB sponsored, from the Soviet camp by indicating that the JVP was CIA sponsored, and from India by indicating that the JVP was anti-Indian and PRC sponsored.
[11] The demands of the Tamils are summarized in the four Thimpu Principles articulated by Tamil negotiators with the government at the Thimpu talks of 1985: Recognition of the Tamils of Ceylon as a nation; Recognition of the existence of an identified homeland for the Tamils in Ceylon; Recognition of the right of self-determination of the Tamil nation; and Recognition of the right to citizenship and the fundamental rights of all Tamils in Ceylon
[12] The ultimate result of the new military assaults is yet to be seen in light of the recent setbacks of the LTTE.
[13] The common features of this repressive policy comprised of detention of youth for extended periods of time in jails, maltreatment, torture and death while in custody, high handed action to disrupt civil activity, prolonged solitary confinement and holding people incommunicado without legal or family access, enforced disappearances, killing youth in a ratio of one to ten or more to terrorise civilians, aerial bombardment of villages and scorched earth policies.
[14] Muslims saw the percentage of Muslim population would drop after the merger from nearly 35 per cent in the East to about 17 per cent in a combined North and East.
[15] It is worth noting that such policies even affected Sinhala speaking Sinhalese in the south and led to discriminatory outcomes against them. However, this paper does not focus on how such discriminatory practices affected the Sinhala working people.
[16] The EPRLF was more orthodox; the EROS was also Marxist; the PLOTE adhered to a socialist revolution; and the TELO did not adhere to any ideology except for achieving a separate state. The LTTE adhered to socialism combined with Tamil Eelam.
[17] This issue is contested by Sinhala nationalists on the basis of proportion of ethnicities in total population, For example, see International Foundation of Sri Lankans undated, Are the Tamils discriminated in Sri Lanka, United Kingdom
[18] paramilitary forces, secret police, and thugs
[19] In Sri Lanka, it is alleged that commencing with Major General Richard Udugama (cousin of Prime Minister SWRD Bandaranayake) in 1958 in the north, through to Major General Tissa Weeratunga in 1979 in the north, and General Janaka Perera and Major General Sarath Fonseka in 1989 in the south, and again in 2000 in the north, to Major General Sarath Fonseka in 2006 in the north have been in charge of such operations.
[20] For example in early 1990, the LTTE massacred hundreds of Muslims in the Eastern Province. Then they expelled about 80,000 Muslims from the Northern Province. They were given from two hours to 48 hours to leave. With their departure commenced the ransacking of their possessions. The physical, economic, social and psychological suffering to which the entire Muslim population in the North was subjected to continues to this day.
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