Friday 30 December 2011

Working Class Movements and Tamil National Struggle A Presentation at “Sri Lanka at Ethnic crossroad” Conference Elvin Hall - University of London 24 March 2007 Lionel Bopage Introduction The solution to the national question in a country has its own specific features stemming from the nature of its historical development, the composition of its population, its social structure, and the degree of its economic and cultural development. In the case of Sri Lanka, there has been a general failure to grapple with the national question and this has become a major obstacle to the unity of the working class movement in the island. Working class movements are expected to actively support human and democratic rights as opposed to ruling classes that usually pinch away these rights. How should working class movements approach struggles against national oppression? The aim of this paper is to look at the complex relationship between class and ethnic aspects of the current conflict, the national question of Sri Lanka, by historical examination of developments of the working class movement and the Tamil national struggle. As a socialist, my examination is mostly underpinned by Marxist thoughts. However, I do not intend to deny the existence of liberal democratic thought that can also take a constructive stand on the national question. Marxist Viewpoint Marxists seek to build international working-class unity by fighting against all forms of privilege and oppression. They support the right of all nations to self-determination, but do not advocate a particular form of self-determination such as the formation of a separate state. It is rather recognition that every single nation is entitled to the same rights. Marxists advocate solidarity and unity of the workers of all nations against capitalist exploitation. While opposing the nationalism of the bourgeoisie of every nation, they support the struggle of the oppressed nations against national oppression because of the "general democratic content" of their struggle against oppression. Marx and Engels supported the right of oppressed nations to national self-determination. It was not unequivocal, but was based on the concrete historical analysis of each national movement at the time and its role in the struggle between the two class camps, i.e., bourgeois and proletarian. Stalin summarised Lenin by stating: that “A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.” Nesiah (2001) defined nationalism as “the ascriptive membership of a politically organised community bound by history, ethnicity and association with an identified territory, and which demands loyalty and sacrifice.” Stalin’s definition still seems to hold ground. Lenin approached the issue from an analysis of historical context of oppressive and imperialist Russian nationalism, where as Luxemburg approached it from an analysis of nationalism of the oppressed people in Poland. Lenin explained that in place of all forms of nationalism Marxism advances internationalism, the amalgamation of all nations in the higher unity. However, he recognised that such an amalgamation could be achieved only through complete democracy and on a voluntary basis. The right to self-determination has become an essential component of Tamil national struggle. Under international law, this right cannot be exercised unilaterally. Kirgis Jr. (1994) showed that this right has many facets including limited autonomy within confederations, and minority rights within a larger political entity. In a recent judgement of the Supreme Court of Canada on the secession of Quebec found that “The Constitution vouchsafes order and stability, and accordingly secession of a province "under the Constitution" could not be achieved unilaterally, that is, without principled negotiation with other participants in Confederation within the existing constitutional framework.” The court went on to state that: effective provision for internal self-determination delegitimises any recourse to unilateral secession while its denial could legitimise a right of secession. How can we relate these experiences to the Sri Lankan situation? A working class movement that supports the oppression of its ruling class is aligned with that class. Such a movement cannot properly wage a struggle against the ruling classes. To defend its own interests, it should break with its ruling class and actively support the struggle of the oppressed. The working class of the oppressor nation must support the right of the oppressed nation to determine its own future, even up to the point of political separation Tamil national struggle Up to the 1940s, the social and political divisions were not based on language and religion, there was no hostilities based on ethnicity of individuals. The Jaffna Youth Congress (JYC), which was a dominant political force in the North in 1920s and 1930s, also influenced delaying the emergence of Tamil ethnic nationalism in the north. The JYC appreciated the harmonious and tolerant relations existed at the time between Sinhalese and Tamils, Moors and Burghers. Since 1948, the Tamils in the island have been systematically denied their legitimate rights, mainly relating to equal opportunities in areas of language, education and employment. It started with The Citizenship Act of 1948, which disenfranchised close to a million Tamil plantation workers. It was followed by the Sinhala only language policy in 1956. It led Tamil political parties to strongly demand a federal framework. The abrogation of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam pact of 1958 and the Dudley-Chelvanayagam Pact of 1968 by the Sinhala political establishment created a lot of anger, frustration and disillusionment among Tamils that eventually led to the birth of separatist militant movements. The speech of Mr Chelvanayakam in 1975, after the victory at KKS by-election, marked the real turning point in the Tamil national struggle towards the demand for a separate state. This followed the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) adopting the Vaddukoddai Resolution in 1976, demanding Tamil Eelam, a separate state for Tamils. According to Nesiah (2001), the Vaddukoddai resolution of 1976 had a massive impact on the political landscape of the island. Following the communal riots of July 1983, the government rushed through legislation to exclude from the parliament, any party that refused to swear allegiance to the unitary Sri Lankan state; thus effectively disfranchising all TULF members. This significantly weakened and isolated the democratic Tamil opposition and made them ineffective. Thus the Tamil population in the north and south remained disfranchised with virtually all their human and democratic rights taken away. This provided the Tamil militant movement with a fertile ground for new recruitments, converting the armed nucleus of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) into a powerful armed group. In late 1980s the LTTE emerged as the dominant Tamil militant group. All other Tamil political groups have now become associates of either the LTTE or the security forces. Lewer and Williams (2002) has characterised the LTTE as an armed group under the control of one person, enjoying broad support from local and Diaspora Tamil communities. It maintains a culture of martyrdom and is capable of sustainable violent action. It has consistently stood for the right to self-determination of the Tamil nation while running a parallel government. While not specifically articulating its own alternative to Tamil Elam, it has consistently demanded that the government offer an alternative based on Thimpu Principles . Successive wars and policies launched against the LTTE for the alleged purpose of weakening them, or isolating them have always boomeranged by further strengthening it. Crisis in the Tamil national struggle Following the signing of the cease-fire agreement in February 2002, the LTTE showed flexibility to negotiate with the government a power-sharing arrangement. However, the negotiations between the government and the LTTE broke down in April 2003. The failure of peace talks can be mainly attributed to the deep seated mutual mistrust between the two parties and their failure to comply with the cease-fire agreement. In September 2003, the LTTE put forward its first set of political proposals in the form of an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA) for the north east. The government declared that ISGA was demanding much more than federalism laying “the legal foundation for a future, separate, sovereign state” . Refusing to hold talks with the LTTE, the government used force to undermine the strength of the LTTE, which led to the escalation of the war. In the seventies and eighties some former Tamil militant organisations with left tendencies attempted to establish political links with the working class movement and the Left in the south. A proposition made to the JVP in 1978, to establish a political dialogue with such organisations, was rejected on flimsy excuses. In the eighties, PLOTE radio broadcast beamed to the south assured Sinhala people that they were not anti-Sinhala movements. However, other militant organisations such as the LTTE took an entirely different approach. Not only did they not try to establish political links during this period but they also assassinated several prominent Tamil leaders who were affiliated with progressive organisations. The LTTE including its leadership seem to have been guided more by their military strength and nationalistic objectives than by their political consciousness. In particular, in the Diaspora, their opportunistic behaviour is evident in their relationships with progressive organisations. When the going gets tough, they would establish political links with the progressives, but only to pursue their own objectives. Yet, when they are stronger, they seem to entirely disregard them. Organisations like the LTTE are less aware of global or regional realities, which is a reflection of their political immaturity, whereas the separatist movements in Aceh, Ireland and in South Africa understood and adopted themselves towards these realities. The LTTE totally relies on advanced capitalist states to support their struggle. Most of those states have proscribed the LTTE, while the Sri Lankan state has not proscribed it. These states have also provided the Sri Lankan state with massive military assistance. It was only through hard experience that the LTTE has come to realise the social, political and military significance of India in their struggle. India, who initially provided them assistance due to regional strategic considerations, afterwards became totally antagonised with the LTTE. Major capitalist powers are increasingly focusing on the Indian subcontinent as a source of reliable cheap labour, natural resources, and profit. Would the LTTE attempt to gain support of major powers, lead them and their policies to be subsumed by the strategic and economic interests of such powers? Their reliance on military power as the method of struggle, rather than on mass mobilisation of Tamil, Muslim and Sinhala working people, seems their major political weakness. Would the LTTE also end up being another armed bourgeois nationalist movement? Malaiyaha Tamils and the Tamil National Struggle Malaiyaha Tamils were brought to Sri Lanka by the British colonialists in 1840s to work in the plantation sector as labourers. According to the CIA World Fact book (2007), they currently constitute about five per cent of the Sri Lankan population and slightly more than half of the total Tamil population. According to Bass (2001), the Malaiyaha Tamil community comprises of two sub-communities, those working in estates and those of the urban middle class providing a leadership role to the workers. Due to class differences, their social and political goals are also different. The social, economic, political and cultural lives of the workers have "centred primarily on plantations, and their identity is thus shaped by it." In recent decades some Malaiyaha Tamils have migrated to areas in the South for employment opportunities and to the North and East for their safety and security. Their movement to the North and East has reduced since the escalation of the war and their increasing alienation from militant Tamil nationalism. Those who seek employment in the cities still face discrimination, suspicion and harassment and even arrests. Despite many economic issues affecting them, over 80 per cent of them continue to live on the estates. The Donoughmore reforms implemented in the 1930s and 1940s granted some Malaiyaha Tamils the right to vote. But Sinhala and Tamil capitalist leaders did not see them as being Sri Lankans. Bass (2001) concluded that “Independence for Sri Lanka in 1948 thus did not mean independence for Malaiyaha Tamils.” The passage of the Citizenship Act of 1948 and the Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act of 1949 made almost all Malaiyaha Tamils disfranchised. This was a deliberate act by the ruling class at that time to weaken the strong linkage between the estate trade union movement and the left movement. For example, the LSSP succeeded in organizing an All-Ceylon Estate Workers Union under their leadership during the upsurge of plantation workers unionization in 1939-40. The disenfranchisement left them in legal limbo and statelessness for several decades to come. In addition, this situation led to the formation of ethnically based trade unions in the estate sector that had relatively less class solidarity with the rest of the trade union movement elsewhere or ideological solidarity with the Left. Proof of the political marginalisation of Malaiyaha Tamils can be evidenced by the following facts: that they were not consulted when government enacted the ‘Sinhala Only Language’ Act; when the Sirima-Shastri pact of 1964 and Srimavo-Indira pact of 1974 were signed; and when agreements were developed with the Tamil movements in the North and East. It is worth noting that in the process of finalising the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam pact of 1957 the government and the Federal Party (FP) agreed to drop the clause concerning the grant of citizenship to Malaiyaha Tamils. This was seen as a betrayal by many Malaiyaha Tamils since FP broke away from the Tamil Congress on the issue of its support for their disfranchisement. To this day, this issue remains a reason why Malaiyaha Tamils act indifferent towards the Tamil national struggle. The growth of political power of Malaiyaha Tamils coincided with the emergence of the militant movement of non-Malaiyaha Tamils and the ongoing armed conflict between the government and the LTTE. The LTTE does not seem to enjoy much support among Malaiyaha Tamils. As Malaiyaha Tamils are often on the receiving end of anti- Tamil violence, harassment and discrimination, they show sympathy towards the Tamil militant movement. However, Malaiyaha Tamils do not regard the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil-speaking people of the island and have no affinity with any political parties or groups in the North and East. Also they do not seem to have a desire to support the LTTE demand for a separate state, as they see themselves as a distinct ethnic group. Despite this, none of the major political parties have taken the grievances of Malaiyaha Tamil citizens seriously. They are still treated as second class citizens. Although there is a gradual improvement of Malaiyaha Tamils in terms of receiving education, not many employment opportunities are available for the young educated Malaiyaha youth. Bass noted that this decade will be critical for Malaiyaha Tamils because without significant government intervention, “the growing number of over-educated and under-employed Malaiyaha Tamil youths may turn to militant protests and violence, as the JVP and LTTE did before them.” Muslims and the Tamil National Struggle The Muslims of Sri Lanka have diverse ethnic origins, but such differences become insignificant compared with their Islamic religious identity. They flourished commercially until the arrival of the Portuguese, who imparted the name ‘Moors' upon them, thus making them a homogeneous ethnic identity. They remained passive to this name change until Sir Ponnambalam Ramanathan attempted to show that the Moors were actually Tamils by ethnic origin. The political motive of this attempt was allegedly to discourage the colonial rulers from appointing a Muslim to the Legislative Council. On that occasion, the Muslim community cleverly used the name ‘Moors’ to differentiate their identity from that of Tamils and hence counter Ramanathan's statement. To this day, this issue has affected the relations between the Tamil militants and the Muslim people. In the early phase of the ethnic conflict, there was peaceful coexistence between the Tamil and Muslim communities. In 1980s, Muslims of the North-East had a reasonably good relationship with Tamil militant groups, and some Muslims had even joined hands with them. However, significant differences surfaced between the Tamils and the Muslims after the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord. They opposed the merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces under the Accord, because after the merger the percentage of Muslim population would decline from nearly 35 per cent in the Eastern Province to about 17 per cent in the combined North-East. In the aftermath of the Premadasa-LTTE negotiations of 1989-90, the LTTE’s anger turned towards both the Government and the Muslim community in the North-East. The LTTE massacred hundreds of Muslims in the East, and in the North the LTTE evicted around 100,000 Muslims from the Jaffna Peninsula. The formation of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) in 1980s paved the way for the Muslims to express their grievances through party politics. Ameerdeen (2006) notes the SLMC has played a significant role in articulating the identity of Muslims, and has constructed the way for protecting the Muslim interests. With the SLMC’s ascendency, the Muslims have been encouraged to seek constitutional safeguards and effective power sharing arrangements. Further escalation of Tamil-Muslim tension in the North-East has now led to the Muslims' demand for a separate unit for themselves in the Eastern province. The LTTE made a conciliatory approach towards Muslims immediately after the signing of the cease-fire agreement. Dr Anton Balasingham in a statement apologised for the LTTE's past mistakes. On 13 April 2002, the LTTE leader Mr Velupillai Pirapaharan and the SLMC leader Mr Rauf Hakeem met in Kilinochchi and issued a Joint Communiqué. This Communiqué agreed that “the Muslims are a separate community with their own identity. The political, cultural and other rights of Muslims, as a distinct community of the North-East, must be safeguarded.” It also noted that “Muslims should be represented at the forthcoming peace talks between the Government and the LTTE and such representation should be from the SLMC.” Nearly three months after the signing of the LTTE - SLMC joint statement, fresh disturbances between Tamils and Muslims broke out. Ameerdeen (2006) attributes the collapse of this agreement to “a sharp wedge between the LTTE's declarations and its actions. It may be that the leadership behaves lethargically or its cadres are very loose.” Working Class Movement and the Left When the language issue first came up in 1956, the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and the Communist Party (CP) stood for the parity of languages, democracy and equality. During the anti-Tamil riots in the south in 1958, they also stood by the Tamils. Their policies were based on complete freedom to use Sinhala and/or Tamil, elimination of any privileges for any one language, religion or culture. For instance, the LSSP’s founding convention proclaimed that it was committed to “the achievement of complete national independence, the nationalization of the means of production, distribution and exchange, and the abolition of inequalities arising from differences of race, caste, creed or sex.” In 1950s, the LSSP and the CP also supported a federal setup to administer the island. The turning point of the left and the working class movement was in 1960s, when the LSSP and the CP entered into coalition politics with the SLFP. The SLFP-LSSP-CP coalition opposed the agreement between the Sinhala and Tamil bourgeois parties that proposed to decentralise some power to the Tamil speaking regions. The policy of standardisation combined with a district quota system, which was introduced by the coalition government in 1970, resulted in a steep decline in the proportion of Tamil students (as a percentage of total admissions) accepted for science, engineering and medical faculties . A prominent leader of the LSSP, Dr Colvn R de Silva, was the architect of the 1972 constitution that abolished the protections given to minorities under section 29 of the Soulbury Constitution, offered Buddhism the ‘foremost place’, and institutionalised preferential treatment to Sinhala Buddhists in educational and economic opportunities. On the increase were systematic harassment of Tamil youth, arbitrary arrests, and detention without trial. These actions by the traditional left were a complete betrayal of the democratic rights of the Tamil people. As a result the Tamil youth movement gathered momentum introducing new nationalist alternatives to the national question. In 1970s, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) took up the policy of the right to self determination of Tamil people. They recognised Sinhala, Tamil and English as the national languages of the Island. The secular nature of the state was guaranteed. However, the JVP discarded its policy of recognising the right to self-determination in 1983, just prior to the Black July riots of 1983. Their campaign in the late 1980s against the Indo Lanka Accord led to assassination of dozens of workers and political opponents for refusing to take part in patriotic protests and strikes. Lerski (1968) reveals that the leaders of the Left and the working class movement did not, on a principled basis, demand the fulfilment of the uncompleted bourgeois democratic tasks, but merely appealed to the Sinhala capitalist leaders to show common decency and more generosity. According to Samarakkody , the leadership of the working class movement was strongly influenced by petty-bourgeois ideology. He states “… obviously the Marxism of the party had no deep roots. The Leninist position on the national question – the right of nations to self-determination – was simply unknown to the party. Thus, the problem of the Tamil nationality was viewed as one of removing some inequalities. Yet, on the issue of citizenship of plantation workers, these leaders took a principled position. The JVP has now degenerated into a Sinhala nationalist party that continues to vehemently oppose federation, i.e., any devolution of power to Tamil speaking regions. They voice slogans on national equality, but have not backed them up with any active support for the struggle of the Tamil people. This is contrary to Leninist principles. Lenin wrote: "Bourgeois nationalism and proletarian internationalism - these are the two irreconcilably hostile slogans that correspond to the two great class camps throughout the capitalist world, and express the two policies (nay, the two world outlooks) in the national question”. He showed that depending on changes in the concrete conditions the question of secession or federation can have exactly opposite solutions, and some popular movements attempted “to use the letter of Marxism against the spirit of Marxism." . Marxists often interpreted federation as a tendency to secede. Lenin's position regarding federation during that period was negative, though he recognised that in certain historical conditions federation for some countries was quite warranted. Thus, in his theses on "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", he pointed out that one could be a determined opponent of federation as a matter of principle but still prefer it to national inequality. He said that Marx, for instance, favoured a federation of Ireland and England when the English were threatening Ireland with forcible subjugation. The opportunistic shift of the left parties on the national question was a betrayal of working class solidarity. Other socialist groups continue to recognise this right but have marginal influence on the working class. The Sinhala nationalist groups, their coalitions and chauvinist fronts charge that those who recognise the right to self-determination encourage division and disintegration of the country. Unlike Lenin and the Bolshevik Party who made a special point of educating the Russian working class on internationalism because the success of the whole working class including the national liberation struggle depended on the internationalism of the Russian working class; its respect for the rights of the working people of other nations and their constant readiness to support the oppressed nations in their struggle, to defend their interests. Conclusion Marxists consider that a holistic solution to the national question can only be sought through a radical transformation of the entire society. Unfortunately, we live under capitalism. So, do we wait for the socialism to usher in and create a heaven with no conflicts? I do not believe so. The Left and the working class movement need to take a firm and unambiguous stand that any proposed solution to the armed conflict includes guarantees of all democratic rights to all the citizens living anywhere in the island irrespective of their socio-economic and cultural background. It is the duty of the working class movement, socialists and democrats to continue to support the right of Tamil people to determine their own destiny. All sections of the Tamil people needs to be mobilised on the basis of the demands for struggle against the process of capitalist globalisation. Such mobilisation of the Tamil people cannot be separated from the mobilisation of the Sinhala working people who are also suffering in numerous similar ways. To achieve such a joint mobilisation the Left need to move away from their hypocritical and opportunist policies. The only way to achieve their freedom from oppression is not by individual terror, nor by creating more oppression; and not by taking away the democratic rights of people; but, by the mobilisation of the oppressed of all nationalities to protect their human and democratic rights. If Sinhala and Tamil working people were to break away from Sinhala and Tamil chauvinism, would that not assist the objective of achieving freedom from oppression? I would like to deal with two issues that came out of our discussion; firstly, the possible unity between Non-Malaiyaha Tamils, Muslims and Malaiyaha Tamils. Nesiah (2006) notes that the distinctions between them are now sharp; in fact, the Tamil-Muslim divide is widening. In the case of Malaiyaha Tamils, I believe that they and the Non-Malaiyaha Tamils may eventually merge, but such a unity cannot be forced. It is worth examining the view expressed by Ali (2001) that the concept of nationalism needs to be discouraged in multicultural and multiethnic societies by promoting the concept of civic nationalism based on shared values of democracy, human rights and the public good. Such a concept will respect, accommodate, and even celebrate “the separateness of ethnic identities.” It is important to note that the multicultural environment in countries practising it have some essential characteristics built into it. All those countries have a devolved state structure based on ethnicity, historicity, or/and geographic realities. All of them promote social values of fairness, co-existence, tolerance, respect, and dignity. Many countries have accepted linguistic and cultural diversity, and government policies in India, Canada, Switzerland, for example, are developed in consideration of this aspect, while in a few countries all migrants have willingly or unwillingly agreed or integrated, in the US, Australia, New Zealand, for example, into working in English. The implication is that Sri Lanka needs to devolve power and recognise diversity of its people as the minimum condition for adopting an effective policy of multiculturalism. I am in favour of implementing a federal solution to resolve the prolonged and self destructive ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. However, any devolution of power based on a federation should be based on non-exclusivity. That is citizens of the island should be able to freely and democratically choose their place of residence in any of the regions. Irrespective of the nature of the state, the reality is that there should be no ethnically exclusive regions and the island should belong to all its citizens. Yet, such rights need complemented with appropriate constitutional guarantees to ensure prevention of enforced settlement schemes to alter the ethnic balance of any region. At the same time, more than million people of all nationalities displaced by war, ethnic cleansing and tsunami should be resettled with their security guaranteed. The overwhelming majority of Tamil, Muslim and Sinhala masses wish an end to the armed conflict. However, the more difficult issue will be agreeing to a political solution that will address the aspirations of Tamil people and the mechanisms that will address concerns of Sinhala and Muslim peoples. This is not possible under the leadership of the current bourgeois parties. What is needed is a non-capitalist political movement that could unite working people in Sri Lanka on the basis of a democratic socialist policy platform, that could reject all special privileges for a particular language, religion, culture, or a region, that could discard all forms of nationalisms, chauvinisms, supremacisms and separatisms. Such a movement need to rely on the support, assistance and solidarity of the working people of all nationalities in Sri Lanka and overseas. As Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr said, the greatest tragedy is not the brutality of the evil people, but rather the silence of the good people. We all need to add our voice and get others to join in, so that our children and grand children will be able to live on with dignity and peace.

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