Australia Must Move Beyond Symbolism in Its Support for a Sovereign Palestine
Lionel Bopage
There was a time when Australia’s foreign policy on the Israel-Palestine conflict was underpinned by broad bipartisan agreement. It was the notion of a two-state solution, in which Israel and a future Palestinian state coexist in peace and security within internationally recognised borders. This consensus reflected both moral obligation and international norms. It was always imperfect, but it was something.
Today, however, that two-state vision is under severe threat—not least from the very man whose leadership is decisive in Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu has repeatedly made clear—most prominently in a December 2023 press conference—that he is “proud” he prevented the establishment of a Palestinian state. He has also publicly rejected several international proposals for Palestinian statehood, insisting that Israel must retain security control over territory west of the Jordan River. These are not arguments born of the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023; similar positions and policies predate that event by many years. The path of blockade, settlement expansion, administrative obstacles, legal restrictions, and diplomatic resistance long preceded and in many ways laid the groundwork for the current collapse of what had been modest hopes for a viable Palestinian state.
Historically, the architecture of a two-state solution was baked into early 20th-century and mid-century international decisions: the Balfour Declaration of 1917; the Mandate for Palestine; United Nations Resolutions, especially following 1947’s Partition Plan; the establishment (or attempted establishment) of Palestinian self-rule and sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza under various treaties (such as Oslo). These landmarks articulated the claim by Palestinians to statehood alongside the Jewish right to a homeland. But over time, every Israeli government—Netanyahu’s included—has been complicit to varying degrees in undermining those efforts. Whether through settlement policy, legal obstacles, securitisation, or diplomatic rebuffs, the cumulative effect has too often been to deny Palestinians sovereignty even in principle.
In this light, the recent decision of the Australian government to recognise the State of Palestine in September 2025 is overdue but significant. It represents a shift from rhetoric to deed: from merely supporting a two-state solution to affirming Palestinian sovereignty as a political reality. It is also a decision made by a democratically elected government, one with the backing (or at least broad tolerance) of Australia’s population. Polls show growing support for recognition and rising frustration with the status quo.
Of course, this recognition is not a magic wand. For many, including those who have suffered decades of dispossession and conflict, it may seem symbolic. But symbols matter—especially when official recognition helps shift the terrain of what is possible in diplomacy and law.
It is important, too, to call out those in our own polity who seem intent on reversing or undermining this recognition. The Liberal-National Party and certain individuals, such as Sussan Ley, have explicitly criticised this recognition and have promised to revoke it if they come to power. These are not abstract disagreements about diplomatic niceties; they are choices about whether Australia stands with human rights, international law, and the legitimate aspiration of a people for a homeland—or whether it aligns itself with powerful states that reject those principles.
Even more urgently, if Australia’s recognition is to mean more than applause, it must be followed by concrete actions. The government should prepare to meet resistance—both diplomatic and political—from Israel, its allies (not least the US), and domestic actors. If the recognition is to safeguard the possibility of a sovereign, free Palestine, then Australia should consider more proactive tools: trade sanctions, restrictions on diplomatic travel, excluding from entry those individuals who are directly complicit in violating international law; perhaps even legal cases in international fora. These aren’t easy tools and come with costs, but if recognition is genuine, they must be on the table.
In summary: Australia has made a commendable step—but it should not delude itself about how much more needs to be done. Allowing Palestine the dignity of a state is not concession; it's justice. The two-state solution is not dead so long as it is still fought for—by diplomacy, by policy, and by principle. Australia can help make that fight less marginal, less symbolic, and more real.
28 September 2025